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The	 paper	 explores	 one	 aspect	 of	 the	 food	 security	 question,	 namely	 the	 livelihoods	 of	
farmworkers,	which	ultimately	speaks	to	the	sustainability	of	farms	and	the	provision	of	food.	It	
focuses	 on	 the	 emergence	of	 locally	made	private	 social	 codes	 (Wine	 and	Agricultural	 Ethical	
Trade	Association	–	WIETA,	and	Sustainability	Initiative	of	South	Africa	–	SIZA)	in	the	Western	
Cape	 fruit	 and	wine	 sectors	 and	 how	 compliance	with	 such	 codes	 has	 increasingly	 become	 a	
requirement	to	export	to	certain	markets	(being	an	aspect	of	vertical	governance	in	the	fruit	and	
wine	 value	 chains).	 Many	 standards	 in	 private	 social	 codes	 duplicate	 rights	 in	 national	
legislation,	but	some	standards	improve	on	statutory	rights	and	certain	enabling	standards	that	
offer	 leveraging	opportunities	 to	worker	organisations	to	 further	 improve	wages	and	working	










SIZA	 codes	 and	 hardly	 any	 attempts	 have	 been	 made	 to	 leverage	 the	 codes.	 The	 only	
contestation	of	the	codes	that	had	a	significant	impact	was	from	an	actor	outside	the	sector	and	
country,	namely	the	documentary	film-maker	who	produced	Bitter	Grapes.	The	paper	questions	
why	 worker	 organisations	 have	 made	 so	 little	 of	 the	 codes.	 The	 low	 capacity	 of	 such	
organisations	is	one	explanation,	but	these	organisations	are	also	disenchanted	with	the	codes	
because	WIETA’s	and	SIZA’s	sanctioning	of	non-compliance	has	been	insufficient.		
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greater	or	 lesser	 extent,	 in	 a	particular	 academic	discipline.	 Studying	 food	 security	 is,	
therefore,	 a	 multi-disciplinary	 project.	 This	 paper	 examines,	 from	 a	 socio-legal	
perspective,	 one	 narrow	 but	 important	 (and	 often	 overlooked)	 aspect	 of	 the	 food	
security	 spectrum,	 namely	 the	 livelihoods	 of	 farmworkers.	 Ultimately,	 the	 focus	 on	
farmworkers’	 livelihoods	speaks	 to	 the	sustainability	of	 farms	and	 food	security	more	
broadly.	The	narrow	 focus	on	 farmworkers,	 one	of	 the	poorest	 communities	 in	 South	




social	 codes,	 is	 contested	 (or	 not	 contested)	 by	 organisations	 representing	
farmworkers,	 within	 the	 context	 of	 national	 legislation	 and	 state	 policies	 that	 aid	 or	
undermine	their	efforts.	The	paper	therefore	contributes	to	understanding	how	power	
in	 a	 particular	 facet	 of	 the	 provision	 of	 food	 plays	 out	 to	 affect	 food	 security	 of	
farmworkers	integrated	into	food	supply	chains.	
	





including	 lead	 firms,	 which	 develop	 their	 own	 ‘in-house’	 codes	 (such	 as	 Tesco’s	
‘Nurture’);	multi-stakeholder	organisations,	such	as	the	Ethical	Trading	Initiative	(ETI)	
and	 the	 Wine	 and	 Agricultural	 Ethical	 Trading	 Association	 (WIETA);	 and	 producer	
organisations,	such	as	the	Sustainability	Initiative	of	South	Africa	(SIZA).	Even	if	a	lead	








that	 exist	 due	 to	 inadequate	 legislation	 and/or	 enforcement	 by	 national	 states.	 This	
means	 the	 codes	 are	 formulated	 and	 implemented	 within	 a	 local	 context	 that	 is	
influenced	 by	 a	 matrix	 of	 power	 dynamics	 between	 various	 local	 actors.	 The	 most	
important	 actor	 in	 this	 matrix	 is	 usually	 the	 state,	 which	 determines	 the	 regulatory	
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regarding	 minimum	 wages,	 requirements	 with	 respect	 to	 working	 conditions,	 and	
health	and	safety	standards.	Such	standards	often	duplicate	national	legislation,	but	can	





three	components	or	stages	 in	 the	 implementation	of	a	social	code:	 the	making	of	 the	
code	 itself	 (which	 might	 be	 an	 ongoing	 process	 because	 of	 regular	 amendments	 to	
standards);	 the	 auditing	 of	 compliance	 with	 the	 standards	 in	 the	 code	 (a	 physical	
inspection	 that	 can	 be	 done	 by	 a	 third	 party);	 and	 certification	 or	 sanctioning	






for	 each	 of	 the	 three	 stages.	 The	 arrangements	 are	 also	 dynamic:	 lead	 firms	 might	
discontinue	 their	own	codes	and	 join	a	multi-stakeholder	organisation,	 in	 the	process	
adopting	the	code	and	enforcement	mechanisms	of	the	latter.		
	
Lead	 firms	do	not	necessarily	require	all	 their	suppliers	 to	comply	with	private	social	
codes,	but	can	insist	that	only	suppliers	in	a	country	or	region	that	has	a	reputation	for	
labour	abuses	adhere	 to	codes.	At	 this	stage,	all	 the	major	retailers	who	 import	South	
African	fruit	(such	as	those	based	in	the	United	States,	United	Kingdom	and	Europe;	the	
main	 destinations	 for	 South	 African	 fruit)	 require	 that	 South	 African	 fruit	 suppliers	






producers	 can	 resist	 the	 imposition	 of	 a	 code	 on	 themselves	 by	 developing	 and	
implementing	 their	 own	 ‘local	 code’.	 A	 local	 code	 can	 replace	 existing	 codes,	 such	 as	
retailers’	own	codes,	if	it	is	viewed	as	acceptable	by	buyers	in	the	global	North.		
																																								 																					
1 Telephonic discussions with Retha Louw, CEO of SIZA (2 October 2017) and Christo Conradie, Manager of Wine Cellars at 
Vinpro (2 October 2017) 
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While	this	means	suppliers	are	still	bound	by	a	code	in	order	to	supply	lead	firms,	they	
have	 at	 least	 created	 the	 code	 themselves	 and	 have	 some	 control	 over	 its	











social	 codes	 is,	 therefore,	an	 important	source	of	power,	which	has	been	described	as	
‘symbolic	power’	(Van	Holdt	&	Webster,	2009:	59–60,	80)	or	‘moral	power’	(Fine,	2007:	
256).	Van	Holdt	and	Webster	contend	that	symbolic	power	is	constituted	in	the	public	
sphere	 and	elaborates	on	 images	 and	 ideas	 that	 resonate	with	 community	 and	public	
consciousness.	Moral	power,	Fine	argues,	involves	the	recasting	of	workers’	struggles	as	
being	one	of	‘right’	against	‘wrong’,	providing	the	basis	for	an	appeal	to	opinion	makers	
and	politicians	 as	well	 as	 to	 allies	 in	 civil	 society.	 These	 are	potential	 new	 sources	 of	
power	 for	 labour	 movements	 that	 are	 battling	 with	 the	 loss	 of	 older	 and	 more	
traditional	sources	of	power	in	the	labour	market.	
	




the	 global	 North,	 but	 much	 can	 slip	 past	 unnoticed,	 where	 the	 distances	 are	 great.	
Contestation	by	workers	and	their	organisations	becomes	much	more	viable	if	the	code	
is	developed	by	their	employers,	and	the	organisation	formed	to	implement	the	code	is	
close	 at	 hand.	 Again,	 there	 is	 dynamism	 in	 this	 contestation.	 There	 is	 likely	 to	 be	
continual	 tension	between	 local	 organisations	 implementing	 codes	 and	 the	 lead	 firms	




unions	 have	 much	 more	 power	 to	 contest	 local	 codes	 –	 from	 design	 through	 to	
implementation,	monitoring	and	re-evaluation	–	than	they	have	with	regard	to	national	
legislation.	On	the	other	hand,	national	 legislation	sets	a	floor	of	rights	with	which	the	






4	 Are trade unions and NGOs leveraging social codes to improve working conditions? A study of two locally developed codes 








Du	 Toit	 &	 Ewert,	 2002;	 Frundt,	 2001).	 Because	 private	 social	 codes	 are	 created	 to	
reassure	 Northern	 consumers	 that	 workers	 in	 the	 global	 South	 are	 treated	 ethically,	
public	attacks	on	the	credibility	of	codes	–	typically	launched	by	activists	via	the	media	–	
can	be	a	powerful	lever	to	improve	the	lives	of	Southern	workers	as	they	‘shame’	lead	









In	 a	 similar	 vein,	 Nelson	 and	 Tallontire	 (2014)	 argue	 that	 local	 actors	 integrated	 in	
value	chains	can,	by	actively	engaging	with	and	shaping	private	social	codes,	use	these	
vertically	 imposed	 governance	 structures	 as	 opportunities	 to	 exert	 horizontal	
governance	 of	 the	 chain.	 Riisgaard	 (2009)	 argues	 that	 private	 social	 standards	 offer	
farmworkers	 and	 their	 organisations	 the	 opportunity	 to	 ‘ride’	 standards,	 that	 is,	 use	
them	 to	 advance	workers’	 interests.	 The	 above	 literature	 has,	 however,	 generally	 not	
focused	on	local	codes	as	a	distinct	type,	that	could	be	more	or	less	effective	at	ensuring	
compliance	 with	 labour	 standards	 and	 more	 or	 less	 susceptible	 to	 pressure	 from	
workers.		
	
The	 South	African	 fruit	 and	wine	 sectors,	which	 are	 located	primarily	 in	 the	Western	




relations	and	 the	 labour	market	 came	only	with	 the	 reform	of	 labour	 legislation	after	
the	democratic	elections	of	1994,	 in	particular	 the	new	Labour	Relations	Act2	and	 the	
new	Basic	Conditions	of	Employment	Act3.	However,	at	about	 the	same	 time,	 the	new	
government	 deregulated	 the	 system	 of	marketing	 boards,	 through	which	 agricultural	
produce	had	previously	been	sold.		
																																								 																					
2 Act 66 of 1995 
3 Act 75 of 1997 
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Under	 the	 marketing	 board	 regime,	 farmers	 –	 represented	 as	 a	 collective	 by	 the	
marketing	 board	 –	 had	 some	 bargaining	 power	 vis-à-vis	 buyers,	 in	 particular	 large	
foreign	retailers.	The	deregulation	of	the	system	meant	that,	at	the	same	time	farmers	
had	to	adjust	to	rising	wages	and	working	conditions,	they	had	to	face	foreign	retailers	




The	 first	 private	 social	 code	 in	 the	 South	 African	 agricultural	 sector	 came	 with	 the	
establishment	of	WIETA	in	2002.	However,	joining	WIETA	was	not	required	in	order	to	
export	 to	 Europe,	 which	meant	 that	 only	 a	 few	wine	 producers	 and	 hardly	 any	 fruit	




South	 African	 producers	 to	 comply	 with	 ethical	 standards,	 while	 all	 Scandinavian	
importers	 require	 South	African	wine	 producers	 to	 comply	with	 ethical	 standards.	 In	
this	paper	we	examine	the	emergence	of	WIETA	and	SIZA.	The	reason	why	these	codes	
were	introduced,	the	impact	they	have	had	on	labour	standards,	and	whether	workers’	




in	 particular	 the	 events	 that	 led	 to	 ethical	 codes	 becoming	 compulsory	 for	 exporters.	
Next,	we	assess	whether	workers’	organisations	have	 leveraged	 the	 codes	 to	 improve	
labour	standards	on	farms	supplying	customers	in	the	global	North.	We	do	so	in	light	of	
low	 trade	 union	 density	 in	 the	 fruit	 and	 wine	 sectors	 and	 very	 limited	 collective	
bargaining.6		
	
Third,	 we	 explore	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 the	 state	 has	 influenced	 the	 capacity	 of	 local	
actors	to	engage	with	codes	to	improve	labour	standards.	Neilson,	Pritchard	and	Yeung	
(2014)	 argue	 that	 state	 action,	 as	much	 as	 inaction,	 creates	 the	 enabling	 or	 disabling	




4 Farmers made increasing use of temporary workers and labour brokers to supply workers. This went along with a 
preference for using labour that lived off the farm.  
5	Only two studies have examined the impact of social codes on working conditions and worker empowerment in the South  
  African context (see Du Toit, 2001, and Barrientos, 2006). Both focused on interventions by the British-based Ethical    
  Trading Initiative (ETI). Du Toit (2001) reported on an ETI pilot conducted in 1998 on South African fruit and wine farms, in  
  which producers participated voluntarily. Barrientos (2006) reported on an assessment of the ETI Base Code in the fruit  
  industry in 2003. Both studies, however, were conducted prior to compulsory enforcement of social codes on wine and fruit  
  farms in the Western Cape for specific markets.	
6 South African farmworkers’ structural and associational power, as defined by Wright (2000), is extremely weak, given that 
farm work is relatively unskilled and that there is an abundance of low-skilled labour in South Africa. Only about 5% of 
South African farmworkers are unionised.  
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views	 standards	 primarily	 as	 a	 way	 to	 secure	 their	 supply	 chains	 and	 manage	
reputational	 risk.	 The	 ‘Pragmatic	 Development	 Narrative’	 begins	 to	 raise	 concerns	
about	the	welfare	of	workers	and	smallholders	in	value	chains.		
	
The	 ‘Broader	Development’	 narrative	 shifts	 the	 idea	of	 standards	 from	a	paternalistic	
worker	welfare	paradigm	to	a	process-oriented	labour	rights	theme	that	also	focuses	on	
workers’	livelihoods.	Lastly,	the	‘Potentially	Transformative’	narrative	regards	workers	
and	 smaller	 producers	 as	 active	 participants	 in	 the	 process	 of	 tackling	 social	 and	
environmental	problems	in	value	chains.	Such	efforts	move	beyond	a	narrow	definition	
of	 labour	 rights	 to	 raise	 higher	 level	 concerns,	 such	 as	 living	 wages.	 We	 find	 this	
typography	of	narratives	a	useful	way	 to	examine	 the	evolution	of	 social	 codes	 in	 the	
fruit	and	wine	sectors	in	South	Africa.	
	
The	overall	 aim	of	 the	paper	 is	 to	 explore	whether	 the	 fact	 that	WIETA	and	 SIZA	 are	
local	bodies	that	implement	‘locally	made’	codes	–	the	main	instruments	being	used	to	





The	 paper	 is	 structured	 as	 follows:	 Section	 2	 outlines	 the	 methodology	 used	 for	 the	
research,	 and	 Section	 3	 discusses	 the	 background	 to	 the	 emergence	 of	 the	 local	
certification	 bodies,	 focusing	 on	 the	 contestation	 that	 led	 to	 their	 establishment.	 The	
progression	from	voluntary	certification	to	enforced	certification	is	also	tracked.	
	
In	 Section	 4	 the	 structure	 and	 functioning	 of	WIETA	 and	 SIZA	 are	 compared,	 but	 the	
main	focus	of	the	section	is	on	a	comparison	of	the	two	codes	with	the	Fairtrade	code.	
The	latter	code	is	viewed	as	the	gold	standard	of	private	social	codes	and	is,	therefore,	a	






7 The Fairtrade code has been adopted by a very small minority of South African fruit and wine producers. 
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2. METHODOLOGY 
The	 research	 involved	 semi-structured	 interviews	with	 seven	 trade	 union	 organisers	
from	 the	 following	 unions:	 the	 Food	 and	 Allied	 Workers’	 Union	 (FAWU);	 BAWSI	
Agricultural	Workers	Union	of	South	Africa	(BAWUSA);	the	Rural	Agriculture	Workers’	
Union	 (RAWU);	 the	 Commercial,	 Stevedoring,	 Agricultural	 and	 Allied	Workers’	 Union	
(CSAAWU);	 Sikhula	 Sonke;	 Agricultural,	 Food,	 Fishing	 and	 Retail	 Industry	 Workers’	
Union	(Afriwu);	and	the	Society	Development	Trade	Union	(SDTU).		
	
Four	 of	 the	 interviews	 were	 conducted	 face-to-face	 and	 two	 were	 telephonic.	 The	
managements	of	three	NGOs	that	deal	with	labour	issues	in	the	agricultural	sector	were	
also	interviewed.	These	were	the	Trust	for	Community	Outreach	and	Education	(TCOE),	
which	 works	 closely	 with	 CSAAWU;	 the	 Association	 for	 Fairness	 in	 Trade	 (AFIT),	 a	
network	 comprising	 small	 farmers	 and	 workers	 on	 Fairtrade	 member	 farms,	 which	
aims	to	help	farmers	and	workers	leverage	the	Fairtrade	code	to	their	advantage;8	and	







the	 producers,	 were	 also	 interviewed.	 Finally,	 Tom	 Heinemann,	 who	 produced	 the	
documentary	Bitter	Grapes,	was	interviewed	and	a	representative	of	the	Swedish	NGO,	





Interviews	were	 supplemented	 by	 a	 desktop	 review	 that	 included:	 an	 analysis	 of	 the	
three	 codes	 (WIETA,	 SIZA	 and	 Fairtrade)	 and	 the	 sectoral	 determination	 (SD13);	
background	 documents	 providing	 more	 information	 about	 the	 codes;	 standard	
operating	 procedures	 for	 conducting	 audits;	 complaints	 procedures;	 and	 background	
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in the South African fruit and wine farming sectors  
3. THE CODES IN THE WESTERN CAPE FRUIT AND WINE SECTORS 
3.1 The emergence of local codes in the wine and fruit 
sectors  
3.1.1. The wine farming sector  
In	1997,	in	an	interview	with	the	British	Broadcasting	Corporation	(BBC),	John	Platter,	a	







participate	 in	 the	 pilot	 project.	 The	 process	 initiated	 a	 discussion	 about	 ethical	 trade	
issues	 among	 South	African	wine	 producing	 organisations,	 organised	 labour	 and	 civil	
society	 stakeholders.	 The	 outcome	 of	 those	 discussions	was	 the	 creation	 of	 the	Wine	
Industry	 Ethical	 Trade	 Association	 (WIETA)	 in	 2002	 (Taylor,	 2003).	 WIETA	 began	
conducting	 audits	 on	wine	 farms	 that	 had	 become	members,	 that	 is,	 the	 audits	were	
voluntary	in	that	they	were	limited	to	those	farms	that	had	joined	WIETA.	The	focus	of	





Media	 coverage	of	 the	protests	was	 extensive	 and	 reached	 the	 ears	of	Northern	wine	
buyers.	 The	 wine	 industry,	 where	 branding	 is	 a	 key	 feature,	 is	 more	 susceptible	 to	





Following	 the	 protests,	 the	 Swedish	 government-controlled	 liquor	 monopoly,	
Systembolaget,	 issued	 a	 ‘red	 flag	 status’	 to	 the	 South	 African	 wine	 industry.	 This	
indicated	 that	 Systembolaget	was	 considering	 stopping	 the	purchase	of	 South	African	
wine.	 Thereafter,	 Systembolaget’s	 entire	 board	 of	 directors	 and	management	 flew	 to	
South	Africa	 to	 familiarise	 themselves	with	working	 conditions	 on	 farms.	 ‘While	 they	






11 Act 62 of 1997 
12 http://www.wieta.org.za/news_article.php?id=898; Interview with Rico Basson, CEO of Vinpro, 3 July 2013, Paarl 
 
	







‘hold’	 and	 intention	 to	 enforce	 audits	 reverberated	 through	 the	 South	 African	 wine	
industry.	Major	South	African	liquor	companies,	such	as	KWV	and	Distell,	informed	their	
bulk	 wine	 suppliers	 that	 the	 farmers	 that	 supplied	 them	 would	 have	 to	 undergo	 an	
audit,	 or	 else	 they	 will	 not	 be	 able	 to	 export	 their	 wine	 to	 Sweden.	 This	 led	 to	 an	
increase	 in	 the	 number	 of	 farms	 being	 audited	 by	WIETA	 from	 20	 to	 100	 farms	 per	
month.	 By	 July	 2013,	 575	 wine	 producers	 had	 signed	 up	 with	 WIETA	 –	 more	 than	
double	the	number	registered	in	the	previous	year.13	
	
The	 creation	 of	 the	 WIETA	 code	 therefore	 started	 with	 the	 failure	 of	 horizontal	
governance	by	the	state	–	specifically	its	failure	to	enforce	new	legislation	extended	to	
farmworkers	after	1994.	The	threat	of	a	boycott	from	ethically	conscious	customers	in	
the	global	North	 led	 to	self-regulation	by	 local	producers,	who	established	 the	 ‘locally	
made’	WIETA	 code	 to	 supplement	 poorly	 enforced	 statutory	 rights.	 But	 contestation	
over	 labour	standards	a	decade	 later,	with	 the	code	becoming	compulsory	 if	 a	 farmer	
wanted	to	export	wine,	led	to	compliance.		






meeting	 she	 confronted	 the	 chairperson	of	Tesco	 about	 her	 poor	working	 conditions.	
The	 response	 from	 Tesco	 was	 a	 promise	 that	 it	 would	 look	 into	 its	 social	 auditing	
procedures	in	South	Africa.	Women	on	Farms	also	invited	the	actress	Emma	Thompson	
to	 South	 Africa,	 who	 vocally	 condemned	 poor	 working	 conditions	 on	 South	 African	
farms	in	the	British	media.	This	generated	further	negative	publicity	for	South	African	
fruit	farmers	(Barrientos,	2009).	Tesco’s	response	was	once	again	to	commission	more	
rigorous	 audits	 of	 its	 supply	 chain.15	 In	 September	 2008,	 Tesco	 launched	 its	 Ethical	




13 SWEDISH RESPONSE WOSA, 31/07/2013. See http://www.wieta.org.za/news_article.php?id=898; Interview with Linda 
Lipparoni, CEO of WIETA, and Amelia Heyns of WIETA, 17 February 2017, Techno Park, Stellenbosch 
14 See: http://www.wfp.org.za/programmes/27-trade-justice/103-trade-justice.html. Also see ‘Introduction to SIZA 
code’.  
15 Interview with Retha Louw, CEO of SIZA, 21 February 2017, Somerset West 
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Fruit	 farmers,	however,	were	unhappy	 that	audits	were	being	 ‘forced’	upon	 them	and	
started	 venting	 their	 anger	 at	 WIETA.	 An	 NGO	 representative	 on	 the	 WIETA	 board	
explained:		
	
Theirs	was	not	 a	 voluntary	 engagement	with	WIETA:	 they	were	being	dragged	
into	the	organisation.	The	stick	was	that	if	you	don’t	cooperate,	then	your	access	
to	 export	 markets	 would	 be	 in	 jeopardy.	 So	 they	 went	 in,	 but	 kicking	 and	
screaming.	In	my	view	[the	main	point	of	contestation]	was	not	primarily	about	
WIETA;	it	was	the	notion	of	not	wanting	to	be	regulated.	At	the	time	that	WIETA	
was	 established,	 the	 sectoral	 minimum	 wage	 was	 also	 being	 introduced	 in	
2003...So	WIETA	was	another	enforcement	agency,	plus	this	one	had	much	more	










for	doing	 so	was	 that	 it	was	uncomfortable	with	WIETA	 simultaneously	being	 ‘player	
and	 referee’,	 which	 referred	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 organisation	 was	 setting	 standards,	
making	 use	 of	 contracted	 auditors	 (who	 were	 essentially	 under	 its	 control),	 and	
eventually	making	the	certification	decision.18	The	route	the	fruit	sector	took	was	to	use	
private	 auditing	 companies	 to	 certify	 farms	 against	 the	 ETI	 Base	 Code.	 At	 about	 the	




and	 retailers.	 It	 was	 argued	 that	 the	 advantage	 of	 such	 a	 code	 would	 be	 to	 avoid	
duplication	 of	 audits	 by	 individual	 retailers,	 each	 of	 which	 had	 its	 own	 in-house	
standards.	 But	 the	 initiative	 can	 also	 be	 seen	 as	 an	 attempt	 by	 producers	 to	 exert	




16 Interview with Mzukisi Mooi, Centre for Rural Legal Studies, Stellenbosch, 15 February 2017 
17 Interview with Mzukisi Mooi, Centre for Rural Legal Studies, Stellenbosch, 15 February 2017 
18 Anonymous source (2), 1 March 2017 
19 Fruit South Africa (FSA) is a non-profit organisation formed by the Citrus Growers’ Association of Southern Africa (CGA); 
HORTGRO (representing pome and stone fruit farmers); South African Table Grape Industry (SATI); SUBTROP (representing 
the avocado, litchi, mango and macadamia industries); and the Fresh Produce Exporters’ Forum (FPEF). It was established 
to address common issues in relation to all aspects of the fruit industry of South Africa. 
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Since	 2007,	when	 Tesco	 started	 to	 require	 South	African	 fruit	 producers’	 compliance	
with	 ethical	 standards,	 other	 international	 retailers	 have	 followed	 suit.	 By	 2017,	
retailers	 in	 all	 the	 South	 African	 fruit	 industry’s	 major	 export	 markets	 –	 with	 the	
exception	 of	 the	 East	 and	 Africa	 –	 required	 that	 their	 suppliers	 comply	 with	 ethical	
standards.		
	
While	 SIZA	 is	 the	 custodian	 of	 its	 own	 code,	 it	 has	 entered	 a	 service	 level	 agreement	
with	five	independent	auditors,	which	producers	can	use	to	conduct	audits	against	the	
SIZA	code.20	The	audit	companies	not	only	conduct	the	audits,	but	also	rate	producers	








3.2 The local code making bodies  
The	 growth	 in	 the	 membership	 of	 local	 code-making	 or	 certification	 bodies	 can	 be	
directly	 attributed	 to	 enforced	 compliance	 with	 ethical	 standards	 requested	 by	
exporters.	 By	 2014,	 a	 year	 after	 audits	 became	 compulsory	 for	 wine	 farmers	 who	
wanted	 to	 export	 to	 the	 Swedish	 market,	 60%	 of	 South	 Africa’s	 winegrowers	 were	
WIETA	 accredited.22	 By	 2017,	 WIETA	 had	 1	453	 members,	 while	 SIZA	 had	
approximately	1	550	members.23	 In	contrast,	 the	number	of	 farms	that	are	voluntarily	




Representation	 of	 labour	 on	 the	 boards	 of	 code-making	 or	 certification	 bodies	 is	
important	 for	 these	organisations	as	well	 as	 for	 labour.	The	bodies	need	 labour	 to	be	
represented	to	give	them	credibility	in	the	public	domain.	Codes	act	as	a	bulwark	that	
protects	 the	 reputations	 of	 producers	 in	 consumer	 markets,	 while	 labour	




20 Interview with Retha Louw, CEO of SIZA, 21 February 2017, Somerset West. Audit companies are required to adopt a code 
of conduct, but also have to adopt the Global Social Compliance Programme reference tool. Auditors are also required to 
meet basic competencies outlined by SIZA and to use a prescribed audit process and methodology. 
21 SIZA audits are uploaded on the SIZA platform, while WIETA audits are uploaded onto the SEDEX platform. SEDEX is a 
global non-profit membership organisation collaborative platform for sharing responsible sourcing data on supply chains. 
Companies use SEDEX to manage their performance around labour rights, health and safety, the environment and business 
ethics. 
22 See: http://www.wieta.org.za/download/New_Wieta_Seal_Fact_Sheet.pdf (visited 3 May 2017). 
23 Interview with Linda Lipparoni, CEO of WIETA, and Amelia Heyns of WIETA, 17 February 2017, Techno Park, Stellenbosch; 
interview with Retha Louw, CEO of SIZA, 21 February 2017, Somerset West 
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representatives.	So,	 it	 seems	 that	whoever	 is	available	at	 the	AGMs	of	unions	 that	are	
members	of	WIETA	get	nominated	to	its	board.	Attendance	at	board	meetings	by	union	
representatives	 also	 seems	 to	 be	 sporadic	 because	 of	 the	 capacity	 constraints	 these	






the	 same,	 which	 CEO	 of	 WIETA,	 Linda	 Lipparoni,	 found	 frustrating.	 She	 argued	 that	
trade	unions	should	be	engaging	more	critically	with	WIETA’s	policy	and	standards:		
	





CSAAWU	 and	 TCOE,	 which	 have	 never	 been	WIETA	 board	members,	 have	 called	 for	










24 Interview with Linda Lipparoni, CEO of WIETA, and Amelia Heyns of WIETA, 17 February 2017, Techno Park, Stellenbosch; 
NGO members include the Centre for Rural Legal Studies, Women on Farms and the National Farm Workers’ Forum. 
25 Interview with Christo Conradie, Manager of Wine Cellars at Vinpro, Paarl, 20 February 2017; See also 
http://www.wieta.org.za/news_article.php?id=898; interview with Linda Lipparoni, CEO of WIETA, and Amelia Heyns of 
WIETA, 17 February 2017, Techno Park, Stellenbosch  
26 Interview with Linda Lipparoni, CEO of WIETA, and Amelia Heyns of WIETA, 17 February 2017, Techno Park, Stellenbosch 
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Despite	 the	above	shortcomings,	WIETA	 is	a	multi-stakeholder	body,	which	 is	not	 the	
case	with	SIZA.	SIZA	has	only	recently	constituted	an	independent	board,	but	there	are	
no	labour	representatives	on	it,	or	on	its	audit	reference	group	or	its	audit	expert	group,	
which	 set	 audit	 policy	 and	 standards,	 and	 adjudicate	 disputes	 over	 audit	 findings,	
respectively.	 SIZA	 has	 approached	 the	 Commission	 for	 Conciliation,	 Mediation	 and	
Arbitration	 (CCMA)	 to	 assist	 it	 to	 recruit	 a	 labour	 representative	 for	 its	 board,	 but	
without	 success.	 This	 begs	 the	 question:	why	 does	 SIZA	 ask	 the	 CCMA	 for	 assistance	




the	 three	 codes,	 it	 has	 no	 workers	 represented	 on	 its	 standards	 committee	 or	 its	
board.28	This	suggests	 that	 the	presence	of	workers	at	board	 level	 is	not	necessarily	a	
prerequisite	for	a	good	code.29		
	
3.3 Local codes compared to the Fairtrade code and 
national legislation  
3.3.1. South African labour legislation  
Labour	 legislation	 in	 the	 agricultural	 sector	 does	 not	 have	 a	 long	 history.	 For	 many	
years	 the	 sector	 was	 excluded	 from	 labour	 legislation	 altogether,	 and	 until	 shortly	
before	 the	 transition	 to	 democracy	 in	 1994	 it	 was	 excluded	 from	 the	 1956	 Labour	
Relations	Act	(LRA)	and	exempted	from	certain	clauses	in	the	1983	Basic	Conditions	of	
Employment	Act	(BCEA).30	 It	was	only	after	the	adoption	of	the	new	LRA	in	1995	and	





sector	which	 set	 a	minimum	wage	 and	 a	 range	 of	 other	 standards	 for	 the	 sector	 not	
dealt	with	in	the	BCEA.31	Although	complemented	by	the	BCEA	and	the	LRA,	SD13	is	the	




27 Interview with Retha Louw, CEO of SIZA, 21 February 2017, Somerset West 
28 The Fairtrade board includes four members nominated by the three producer networks, four members nominated by the 
national Fairtrade organisations and three independent members. 
29 In 2010 Fairtrade established the Advisory Committee on Workers’ Rights and Empowerment (WRAC) to strengthen its 
knowledge of and partnerships with trade unions and labour rights organisations. WRAC consists of representatives of trade 
unions, labour rights NGOs, companies and Fairtrade members. Fairtrade consults the committee on ways to promote 
freedom of association and worker organisation and for advice on wage levels. 
30 Respectively, Act 28 of 1956 and Act 3 of 1983 
31 Sectoral determinations are issued in terms of the BCEA. They set wages and vary some of the conditions in the BCEA to 
fit the circumstances of specific sectors. 
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Given	 the	 number	 and	 geographical	 spread	 of	 farms,	 the	 Department	 of	 Labour	 has	
adopted	 a	 strategy	 of	 ‘blitz’	 inspections,	 but	 concerns	 have	 been	 raised	 that	 the	
inspections	are	not	rigorous	enough.	Furthermore,	 it	 is	alleged	that	the	inspections	do	
not	 provide	 sufficient	 guarantee	 of	 compliance	 with	 labour	 standards	 for	 overseas	
buyers.	 So,	 despite	 the	 inclusion	 of	 the	 agriculture	 sector	 within	 the	 post-apartheid	
labour	regulatory	framework,	poor	enforcement	means	that	many	farmworkers	do	not	
enjoy	the	protection	of	the	rights	they	have	on	the	statute	book.		
3.3.2. Fairtrade and the two local codes   
Fairtrade	 is	 a	 well-established,	 international	 certification	 scheme,	 started	 by	 Max	
Havelaar	and	Solidaridad	in	1988.	Its	code	has	benefited	from	years	of	experience	and	
continuous	 refinement.	 It	 has,	 as	 a	 result,	 become	 something	 of	 a	 gold	 standard	 for	
private	social	codes.	This	makes	 it	a	good	benchmark	against	which	to	assess	 the	 two	
local	 codes.	 The	 paper	 compares	 key	 standards	 in	 the	 WIETA	 and	 SIZA	 codes	 with	
Fairtrade’s	 Hired	 Labour	 Standard	 (hereafter	 referred	 to	 as	 the	 Fairtrade	 code),33	 in	
particular	 the	 Labour	 Conditions	 section,	 and,	 to	 a	 lesser	 extent,	 the	 Trade	 section	
(which	 is	 concerned	 with	 issues	 such	 as	 the	 traceability	 of	 Fairtrade	 products	 and	
ensuring	sustainable	trade).34		
	
The	 three	 codes	 have	 all	 been	 shaped	 by	 South	 African	 legislation,	 as	 well	 as	 the	
conventions	 and	 recommendations	 of	 the	 ILO.	 The	 components	 of	 the	 three	 codes	
dealing	with	labour	conditions	comprise	six	areas	that	prescribe	rights	and	standards	in	
the	workplace:	 the	 right	 to	 freedom	of	 association	and	 collective	bargaining;	 freedom	
from	discrimination;	 freedom	 from	 forced	 and	 compulsory	 labour;	 protection	 against	





3.3.3. Standards that improve on statutory rights 
Certain	standards	in	the	codes	improve	on	the	equivalent	rights	in	national	legislation.	
These	standards	include	the	payment	of	a	living	wage;	the	requirement	to	have	a	rainy	
day	policy;	 having	 a	 job	 grading	 system	 in	place	 to	prevent	 discrimination;	 providing	
breaks	 to	 nursing	 mothers;	 providing	 a	 pension	 scheme	 to	 permanent	 workers;	 and	
paying	for	the	transportation	of	migrant	workers.	
																																								 																					
33 Fairtrade has two separate codes: one for small farmers, and one for farmers making use of hired labour. A farm making 
use of hired labour is defined as one that is not membership-based and at which the main share of the work is carried out 
by hired labour. See: FLOCERT Glossary at: http://www.flocert.net/glossary/ 
34 The Fairtrade Hired Labour Standard has four main sections: Social Development (which largely regulates the management 
of Fairtrade premiums that workers receive from the sale of Fairtrade-certified products); Labour Conditions (which 
include health and safety in the workplace); Trade; and Environmental Development. The Social Development and 
Environmental Development sections are not relevant to the comparison we make and are therefore omitted. 
35 These include: BCEA; LRA; Employment Equity Act (Act 55 of 1989); Unemployment Insurance Act (Act 63 of 2001); 
Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act (Act 61 of 1997); Occupational Health and Safety (Act of 1993); 
Children’s Act (38 of 2005); and SD13. 
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A living wage 
The	history	of	extremely	low	wages	in	the	agricultural	sector	and	the	demand	for	a	daily	
wage	of	R150	in	the	2012	De	Doorns	protests	makes	the	references	to	a	living	wage	in	









cash	 wage	 was,	 therefore,	 only	 slightly	 higher	 than	 the	 minimum	 wage	 of	 R104.94	
prescribed	in	SD13	in	March	2013,	following	the	De	Doorns	protest.	In	contrast,	a	report	
by	the	Bureau	for	Food	and	Agricultural	Policy	(BFAP)	found	that,	even	if	a	husband	and	
wife	 each	 received	 a	 cash	 wage	 of	 R150	 per	 day,	 their	 combined	 income	 would	 be	




them	 to	 increase	 wages	 annually	 to	 close	 the	 gap,	 that	 is,	 a	 farmer	 must	 negotiate	
‘incremental	 steps	 and	 [a]	 timeline	 toward	 the	 applicable	 living	 wage...with	 trade	
union/elected	 worker	 representatives’(FTC:	 3.5.4).	 The	 rider	 that	 producers	 take	
‘incremental	steps’	potentially	gives	farmers	some	breathing	space	but	could	also	invite	





are	 not	 sufficient	 to	 justify	 an	 increase	 toward	 a	 living	wage,	 wage	 increases	will,	 at	
least,	cover	 inflation	until	 the	situation	is	resolved	(FTC:	3.5.4).	Given	the	doldrums	in	
which	 the	 South	 African	 wine	 industry	 finds	 itself,	 many	 producers	 would	 probably	
qualify	to	invoke	this	escape	clause.	
	
The	WIETA	code	has	a	much	vaguer	definition	of	 a	 living	wage,	which	 states	 that	 the	
wage	must	be:	‘enough	to	allow	employees	and	their	households	to	secure	an	adequate	
livelihood.	This	should	be	sufficient	 to	meet	basic	needs	such	as	 food,	clothing,	shelter	
and	 education,	 and	 to	 have	money	 left	 over	 for	 discretionary	 spending’	 (WC:	 8,	 own	
italics).	 The	qualifiers	 ‘enough’	 and	 ‘sufficient’	 are	open	 to	wide	 interpretation,	which	
frustrates	enforcement.	Moreover,	the	WIETA	code	states	that	producers	should	‘strive’	
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With	 regard	 to	 payment	 to	 workers	 on	 days	 they	 cannot	 work	 because	 of	 rain,	 the	
Fairtrade	code	provides	only	that	if	the	principle	of	‘no	work;	no	pay’	applies,	it	should	
be	clearly	recorded	in	workers’	employment	contracts.	In	the	context	of	extremely	low	
wages	 and	 the	 negligible	 bargaining	 power	 of	 farmworkers	 this	 standard	 in	 the	





in	 place	 in	 respect	 of	 payment	 for	 workers	 on	 rainy	 days,	 which	 policy	 must	 be	
communicated	to	workers.	This	 is	not	much	of	an	 improvement	on	the	Fairtrade	code	
because	 policy	 provisions	 are	 left	 to	 the	 employer	 to	 determine,	which	 could	mean	 a	
principle	 of	 ‘no	 work;	 no	 pay’	 is	 applied.	 The	 WIETA	 code,	 however,	 contains	 best	
practice	guidelines	for	rainy	days,	stating	that	workers	should	a)	be	paid	on	rainy	days,	
even	 if	 they	 do	 not	work;	 or	 b)	 be	 provided	 alternative	work	 that	 can	 be	 performed	
under	cover;	or	c)	receive	training	on	rainy	days,	but	these	are	guidelines	only	and	are	








leaves	 the	 granting	 of	 such	 breaks	 to	management’s	 discretion.	 It	 also	 does	 not	 state	






















A	 major	 potential	 leverage	 point	 for	 worker	 organisations	 of	 all	 three	 codes	 is	 the	
controls	 the	 codes	 put	 in	 place	 to	 protect	workers	 employed	 by	 labour	 brokers.	 The	
Fairtrade	 code	 requires	 producers	 to	 phase	 out	 the	 use	 of	 labour	 brokers,	 unless	
exceptional	 conditions	 apply	 that	 are	 sanctioned	 by	 the	 certification	 body.	 Hence,	 it	




both	 codes	 have	 strict	 conditions	 to	 ensure	 that	 such	 workers	 are	 not	 exploited.	
Furthermore,	 both	 codes	 aim	 to	 extend	 their	 standards	 to	 labour	 brokers.	 The	 codes	
therefore	 provide	 for	 the	 accreditation	 of	 labour	 brokers	 and	 require	 that	 certified	
producers	 use	 only	 certified	 brokers.	 To	 this	 end	 WIETA	 and	 SIZA	 have	 jointly	
developed	 an	 audit	 readiness	 methodology	 for	 labour	 brokers	 and	 have	 trained	 47	








hygiene,	 and	 include	 regular	 upkeep	 and	 improvement	 of	 housing	 and	 related	
communal	facilities.	If	sanitary	facilities	are	shared,	a	reasonable	number	of	toilets	and	
bathing	 facilities	 with	 clean	 water,	 per	 number	 of	 users,	 and	 according	 to	 regional	
practice,	 are	 available’	 (FTC:	 3.5.28;	 own	 italics).	 The	 terms	 ‘reasonable’	 and	 ‘regular’	
are	open	to	interpretation.		
	
Fairtrade	 prefers	 that	workers	 do	 not	 stay	 on	 the	 farm,	 unless	 farms	 are	 located	 far	
from	the	nearest	 town/settlement;	 if	housing	 is	not	available	 in	sufficient	quantity	(in	
such	 settlement);	 or	 where	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 employment	 requires	 that	 the	 worker	
should	 be	 available	 at	 short	 notice	 (FTC:	 3.5.28).	 The	 Fairtrade	 code	 under	 certain	
conditions	provides	a	disincentive	for	housing	workers	on	farms	by	requiring	farmers,	if	
the	majority	 of	workers	 live	 on	 the	 farm,	 to	 pay	 the	workers	who	 live	 off	 the	 farm	 a	
housing	 allowance.	 In	 other	 words,	 farmers	 can	 reduce	 costs	 by	 ensuring	 that	 the	
																																								 																					
36 WIETA newsletter, Quarter 4, October 2015  
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majority	 of	 workers	 live	 off	 the	 farm,	 therefore	 eliminating	 the	 need	 to	 pay	 the	





are	 higher	 than	 the	 Fairtrade	 code	 and	 also	 exceed	 those	 prescribed	 in	 SD13.37	 The	
latter	 regulate	 housing	 conditions	 only	 if	 the	 farmer	makes	 a	 deduction	 (up	 to	 10%)	
from	the	workers’	wages	for	housing	(see	section	5	of	SD13).	The	WIETA	code	requires	
that	 if	workers	are	housed	on	the	 farm,	 the	employer	must	have	a	housing	policy	and	
plan	in	place.	The	SIZA	code	requires	only	a	maintenance	plan.	Both	codes	require	that	
employers	enter	a	housing	agreement	with	 the	heads	of	households.	The	WIETA	code	
also	 has	 detailed	 requirements	 regarding	 the	 quality	 of	 housing.	 These	 include	 that	
housing	 be	 structurally	 sound,	 wind-	 and	 waterproof;	 adequately	 insulated	 and	
ventilated;	 that	 it	 should	 be	 kept	 in	 good	 repair;	 and	 that	 it	 is	 free	 from	 rubbish.	
Significantly,	 it	also	requires	that	farmers	install	electricity	 in	workers’	houses,	stating	
that	wood	is	an	inadequate	source	of	energy.	It	also	calls	for	the	provision	of	drinking	




Importantly,	 if	 producers	 do	 not	 comply	 with	 WIETA’s	 standards	 on	 housing	
infrastructure,	 sanitation	 and	water	 quality,	 they	 are	 penalised:	 audits	 are	 conducted	






in	 South	 Africa.	 This	 means	 that	 standards	 with	 regard	 to	 housing	 need	 to	 strike	 a	
balance	between	ensuring	decent	housing	and	providing	a	disincentive	 for	 farmers	 to	
continue	to	employ	workers	who	live	on	the	farm.	It	seems	at	this	point,	however,	that	








37 SD13 sets very basic housing standards that producers have to comply with in the case where workers live on the farm and 
where the producer deducts 10% from their wages for housing. 
38 Interview with Linda Lipparoni, CEO of WIETA, and Amelia Heyns of WIETA, 17 February 2017, Techno Park, Stellenbosch 
39 Conditional certificates are issued on an annual basis, instead of every three years, which means that the farm has to be 
audited annually, at increased cost to the producer. 
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Enabling	rights	
The	 Fairtrade,	 WIETA	 and	 SIZA	 codes	 all	 include	 standards	 to	 make	 workers	 more	
aware	 of	 their	 labour	 rights.	 For	 instance,	 they	 each	 require	 that	 workers	 receive	
training	on	their	rights	as	workers	and	on	the	code	itself,	so	that	they	can	monitor	code	
implementation	 (see	 FTC:	 2.2.1;	WB:	 00.01(e),	 SC:	 2.5).	 Additionally,	 the	WIETA	 and	
SIZA	 codes	 require	 that	 such	 training	 be	 provided	 in	 a	 language	 that	 workers	
understand.	Both	SIZA	and	WIETA	have	developed	a	training	DVD	for	workers	and	have	
delivered	 training	 to	 farmworkers	 on	 various	 aspects	 of	 their	 rights,	 including	 health	
and	safety	in	the	workplace	and	the	safe	handling	of	agrochemicals.40	
	
The	 three	 codes	 attempt	 to	 give	 workers	 some	 measure	 of	 voice	 by	 stipulating	 that	
employers	implement	a	grievance	procedure.	But	for	trade	unions	the	most	important	
sections	 of	 the	 codes	 are	 arguably	 those	 dealing	 with	 freedom	 of	 association	 and	
collective	 bargaining.	 All	 three	 codes	 require	 producers	 to	 respect	 the	 fundamental	
rights	of	 freedom	of	association;	collective	bargaining;	and	non-discrimination	against	




The	 Fairtrade	 code	 is	 significantly	 better	 than	 the	 two	 local	 codes	 when	 it	 comes	 to	
promoting	 enabling	 rights.	 The	 background	 to	 this	 is	 provided	 in	 ‘A	 New	 Workers	
Rights	 Strategy	 for	 Fairtrade’,	 which	 accompanied	 the	 release	 of	 its	 revised	 Hired	
Labour	 code	 in	 2014.	 The	 new	 strategy	 signals	 an	 intention	 for	 Fairtrade	 to	 ‘move	
beyond	 the	 traditional	 [corporate	social	 responsibility]	paradigm	of	 social	 compliance	
based	 on	 standard-setting	 and	 auditing’,	 and	 to	 rather	 focus	 on	 helping	 to	 ‘build	 the	
conditions	whereby	workers	have	the	tools	and	ability	to	negotiate	their	own	wages	and	
terms	 of	 work’.42	 Alistair	 Smith,	 Banana	 Link's	 International	 Coordinator	 and	
representative	 on	 Fairtrade’s	 Workers’	 Rights	 Advisory	 Committee,	 states	 that:	 ‘The	




their	enabling	rights	and	are	 free	 to	exercise	 them	without	 fear	of	victimisation.	First,	
one	of	the	development	criteria	of	the	Fairtrade	code	is	that	trade	union	officials	(or,	in	
their	 absence,	 elected	 worker	 representatives)	 are	 trained	 annually	 during	 working	
hours	on	labour	legislation	and	negotiation	skills.		
																																								 																					
40 The requirements of section 30 of the BCEA, ‘Informing employees of their rights’, are much less onerous.  
41 Auditors, for instance, monitor compliance with freedom of association by asking workers if they are allowed to join a 
union if they want to; if a union organiser had ever visited the farm; and whether the farmer has ever threatened them if 
they would join a union. If there is a trade union presence on the farm, then shop stewards and/or union members must be 
interviewed. Auditors also check if subscriptions are being deducted from workers’ wages. Disciplinary records are checked 
to see that those disciplined are not predominantly union members. 
42 From: ‘A New Workers Rights Strategy for Fairtrade’ (Undated). Available online at: 
https://www.fairtrade.net/fileadmin/user_upload/content/2009/resources/2012-06-20_Workers_rights.pdf 
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Second,	while	the	LRA	grants	certain	organisational	rights	to	trade	unions	only	if	 they	
are	deemed	to	be	 ‘sufficiently	representative’,	and	others	are	granted	only	 if	 the	trade	
union	 represents	 the	 majority	 of	 workers,	 the	 Fairtrade	 code	 gives	 unions	
organisational	 rights	 even	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 significant	 levels	 of	 representation.	 This	
includes	 protocols	 to	 allow	 unions	 and	 farmworker	 organisations	 access	 to	 farms	 to	
organise	workers	 (see	FTC:	3.4.5,	3.4.8).44	The	Fairtrade	code,	 furthermore,	 stipulates	
that	trade	union	officials	have	access	to	workers	and	can	meet	with	them	regularly	as	
well	as	have	meetings	with	senior	management	every	 three	months	 (see	FTC	3.4.8).45	





organise	 workers	 and	 it	 seeks	 to	 promote	 collective	 bargaining.	 It	 requires	 that	
employers	‘ensure	that	wage	increases	and	benefits	of	employment	or	any	other	change	
to	 the	terms	and	conditions	of	employment	are	determined	through	a	 fair	negotiation	
process	 in	which	workers	 get	 a	 genuine	 opportunity	 to	 represent	 their	 interests’(see	
WC:	 04.01(b)).	 This	 effectively	 creates	 a	 duty	 to	 bargain.	 However,	 support	 for	 these	
enabling	 rights	 is	weak:	an	NGO	board	member	 stated	 that	when	he	 suggested	 to	 the	




The	 SIZA	 code	 is	 more	 limited	 with	 regard	 to	 enabling	 rights:	 it	 does	 not	 prescribe	
guidelines	 to	 facilitate	 union	 access	 to	 farms.	 Dialogue	 is	 encouraged	 by	 the	





In	 the	 absence	 of	 unionisation	 on	 farms,	 the	 two	 local	 codes	 promote	 the	 creation	 of	




44 The LRA does not define the term ‘sufficiently representative’. Moreover, whether a union is sufficiently representative 
depends on the definition of the workplace, which is open to interpretation.  
45 The Fairtrade Code (3.4.8) states that an employer must ensure ‘that trade union/elected worker representatives : 1) 
have access to all workers in the workplace during working time without interference or 
the presence of management representatives and at agreed times, on average every 
three months; 2) can meet among themselves during regular working hours, at least once a month for one 
hour; and 3) meet representatives of senior management during working hours at least once every three 
months. These meetings are scheduled on a regular basis and are documented.’ 
46 Interview with Mzukisi Mooi, Centre for Rural Legal Studies, Stellenbosch, 15 February 2017 
47Interview with Linda Lipparoni, CEO of WIETA, and Amelia Heyns of WIETA, 17 February 2017, Techno Park, Stellenbosch 
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Even	 if	 worker	 committees	 are	 elected	 by	 workers	 without	 any	 interference	 by	
management,	 unions	 argue	 that	 they	 are	 powerless	 because	 they	 cannot	 compel	
employers	 to	 bargain.	 The	 committees	 therefore	 create	 an	 illusion	 of	 worker	
representation	where	there	is	none.		
	
Workers’	 committees	 do,	 however,	 provide	 workers	 with	 some	 measure	 of	
representation	 in	 a	 context	 of	 extremely	 low	 levels	 of	 unionisation.	 This	 is	 especially	
relevant	with	regard	to	seasonal	workers,	who	are	generally	reluctant	to	join	unions	for	
fear	that	their	contracts	will	not	be	renewed	(see	FTC:	3.4.11).	This	suggests	that	unions	
could	 be	more	 strategic	 about	worker	 committees	 and	 engage	with	 them	 in	 order	 to	
facilitate	organisation,	rather	than	rejecting	them	out	of	hand.		
3.3.4. Gaps and weaknesses in the codes    
There	 are	 some	 surprising	 gaps	 in	 the	 codes.	 A	 glaring	 example	 is	 SIZA’s	 silence	 on	





farmworkers.	 In	 contrast,	 the	 WIETA	 code	 (10.1)	 states	 that	 ‘employers	 and	 farm	
owners	shall	comply	with	the	provisions	of	ESTA	in	respect	of	those	living	on	their	land.	
In	particular,	employers	shall	respect	the	occupational	rights	of	farm	dwellers,	and	shall	
comply	with	 the	 provisions	 of	 the	 legislation	 insofar	 as	 these	 regulate	 the	 eviction	 of	
those	living	on	the	farm.’	
	
Given	 the	 generic	 nature	 of	 the	 Fairtrade	 code,	which	 is	 applicable	 internationally,	 it	
makes	 no	 reference	 to	 ESTA.	 Instead,	 the	 code	 states	 that	 farmers	 have	 to	 adhere	 to	
country	legislation,	thereby	indirectly	requiring	compliance	with	ESTA.	However,	given	
that	 in	 the	 past	 the	 Fairtrade	 code	 had	 issued	 specific	 guidelines	 for	 South	 Africa	 in	
respect	 of	 Black	 Economic	 Empowerment,	 it	 is	 surprising	 that	 it	 does	 not	 have	 an	
explicit	 standard	 on	 the	 issue	 of	 evictions,	 especially	 since	 it	 is	 such	 a	 controversial	
issue.		
	




migrant	 workers	 could	 change	 soon	 because	 both	 SIZA	 and	 WIETA	 are	 considering	
incorporating	elements	of	Britain’s	Modern	Slavery	Act	into	their	codes.48		
																																								 																					
48 Interview with Linda Lipparoni, CEO of WIETA, and Amelia Heyns of WIETA, 17 February 2017, Techno Park, Stellenbosch; 
interview with Retha Louw, CEO of SIZA 21 February 2017, Somerset West 
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producer	 input,	 the	 local	 codes	make	no	attempt	 to	regulate	relationships	beyond	 the	
farm	gate.		
	
Lipparoni	 argued	 that	 this	 limitation	 is	 becoming	 extremely	 problematic	 in	 the	wine	
industry,	where	some	buyers:	
…have	 literally	 forced	 compliance	 on	 suppliers.	 But…the	wine	 industry	 is	 not	 a	
sustainable	 industry.	 Half	 the	 wine	 industry	 is	 basically	 in	 the	 red,	 not	 even	
breaking	even,	let	alone	making	a	profit…If	you	get	to	a	wine	farm	that	is	only	15	
hectares,	 to	meet	all	 the	minimum	standards	 is	very	cost	 intensive.	 It	 is	not	 that	
the	 farmer	 does	 not	 want	 to	 do	 it,	 but	 [to	 meet	 all	 the	 requirements	 of	 the	
standard]	 a	 lot	 of	 things	 need	 to	 happen	 on	 a	 small	 unit	 at	 a	 time	 when	




that	 encourages	 brutal	 exploitation	 is	 conveniently	 avoided	 in	 social	 codes,	 which	
ensures	that	worker	welfare	 is	neatly	 turned	 into	the	suppliers’	problem.	Referring	to	
the	ETI’s	Base	Code	provision	that	living	wages	should	be	paid,	he	observes	that:	‘Never	
is	 the	 document	 indiscreet	 enough	 to	 consider	 the	 possibility	 that	 the	 payment	 of	 a	
living	wage	 requires	 a	 cut	 in	 retailers’	 own	 profits.	 If	 the	 ETI’s	 NGO	 and	 trade	 union	
members	are	to	make	a	real	impact,	this	kind	of	coyness	will	have	to	be	challenged’.	
3.3.5. Duplicating national legislation    
A	potential	advantage	of	private	social	codes	over	national	legislation	is	that	they	have	
the	 scope	 to	 go	 beyond	 the	minimum	 standards	 set	 in	 statutes,	 and	 the	 standards	 in	
codes	can	be	more	easily	introduced	or	changed	than	legislation	can.	However,	except	in	
the	case	of	the	standards	discussed	above,	both	the	WIETA	and	SIZA	codes	(especially	
the	 latter)	 largely	 duplicate	 national	 legislation	 and	 SD13.	 The	 exceptions	 are	 the	
WIETA	 code’s	 requirements	 that	 producers	 have	 a	 policy	 in	 place	 to	 facilitate	 union	
access	to	farms	and	must	negotiate	changes	to	wages	and	conditions	of	employment,	as	
well	 as	 its	 relatively	 high	 standards	 on	 housing	 and	 the	 strict	 conditions	 placed	 on	
farmers	who	engage	labour	brokers.		
																																								 																					
49 Interview with Linda Lipparoni, CEO of WIETA 17 February 2017, Techno Park, Stellenbosch 
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What	is	the	rationale	for	codes	to	duplicate	national	legislation?	It	seems	that	the	only	
advantage	 is	 better	 enforcement	 of	 statutory	 rights.	 A	 problem	with	 codes	 having	 an	
orientation	 to	 national	 legislation	 is	 that	 they	 tend	 to	 replicate	 inadequacies	 in	 the	
legislation.	This	applies	particularly	to	rights	for	non-permanent	farmworkers.	The	LRA	
and	BCEA	were	drafted	with	standard	employment	in	mind,	and	this	is	much	the	same	
with	 SD13.	 Temporary	 (including	 seasonal)	 and	 part-time	 workers	 are	 not	 excluded	
from	 regulation,	 but	 neither	 are	 they	 specifically	 regulated,	 other	 than	 through	
requirements	that	they	must	receive	the	same	statutory	benefits	as	permanent	workers,	
but	on	a	pro	rata	basis.	Yet,	even	this	right	is	tenuous,	as	existing	legislation	is	open	to	
interpretation;	 for	 example	 the	 payment	 of	 pro	 rata	 leave	 is	 left	 to	 the	 discretion	 of	




	The	 WIETA	 code	 is	 more	 progressive	 than	 the	 SIZA	 code,	 specifically	 its	 aim	 to	
strengthen	 workers’	 enabling	 rights.	 This	 is	 arguably	 because	 it	 has	 labour	




emphasis	 is	 also	 different,	 which	 probably	 reflects	 the	 process	 through	which	 it	 was	
created.	Whereas	the	main	aim	of	the	two	local	codes	seems	to	be	to	achieve	increased	










(such	 as	 WIETA’s	 standards	 on	 rainy	 days,	 breastfeeding	 and	 a	 living	 wage)	 the	





50 The practice of not paying seasonal workers paid leave if they work on a farm for less than a four months’ continuous 
period is widespread and can be attributed to the fact SD13 allows for different interpretations of when paid leave for 
temporary workers should be paid out. Section 21(1)(b), read together with 29(1)(d)–(e), results in producers only paying 
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Borrowing	 from	Nelson	and	Tallontire’s	 (2014)	narrative	analysis,	 SIZA	 can	be	 firmly	
located	 in	 the	Global	 Sourcing	narrative,	while	 the	multi-stakeholder	WIETA	 is	 in	 the	
Pragmatic	Development	narrative.	In	contrast,	the	much	stronger	focus	of	the	Fairtrade	
code	 on	 the	 promotion	 of	 enabling	 rights	 places	 it	 in	 the	 Broader	 Development	
narrative.		
	
3.4 Auditing compliance  
The	three	bodies	separate	the	setting	of	standards	from	the	auditing	process	to	ensure	











as	 to	 check	 the	 veracity	 of	 information	 collected	 to	 ensure	 fairness	 to	 all	 parties.	
Furthermore,	 the	 three	 organisations	 require	 a	 certain	 level	 of	 education	 and	
experience	 on	 the	 part	 of	 auditors	 before	 they	 are	 allowed	 to	 conduct	 audits.51	 The	
standard	operating	procedures	are	available	on	 the	websites	of	Fairtrade,	WIETA	and	
SIZA,	which	means	that	worker	organisations	are	able	to	scrutinise	them.		
3.4.1. Audit protocols   
The	three	bodies	have	detailed	protocols	in	place	to	ensure	the	quality	and	credibility	of	
audits.	 Key	 to	 these	 protocols	 is	 that	 information	 gathered	 during	 audits	 should	 be	
triangulated	 through	 a	 site	 inspection,	 interviews	 and	 documentation.	 The	 protocols	
also	 have	 procedures	 to	 prevent	 bias,	 such	 as	 prescribing	 worker	 sampling,	 and	 to	
ensure	confidentiality	of	all	 information.	However,	 the	requirement	 for	confidentiality	
makes	the	inclusion	of	third	party	observers	(including	trade	union	organisers)	during	
audits	 problematic.52	 To	 counter	 this,	 the	 protocols	 state	 that	 if	 there	 are	 union	
members	on	a	 site,	 then	 the	auditors	must	 include	union	members	 in	 their	 sample	of	
interviewees.	Further,	the	protocols	attempt	to	allow	some	participation	by	workers	in	
the	audit	process,	other	than	them	being	interviewed	by	the	auditor,	by	suggesting	(that	
is,	 it	 is	not	a	requirement)	 that	workers	should	be	present	at	 the	opening	and	closing	
meetings	of	the	audit.		
																																								 																					
51 Social auditors must be familiar with the sector and have a very good understanding of employment legislation and its 
practical implementation. Both SIZA and WIETA use an Auditor Competency Reference Tool (in line with the procedures 
described by the Global Social Compliance Programme) to gauge whether auditors are competent enough. Only audit 
companies that have completed the GSCP equivalence process are allowed to conduct SIZA audits. 
52 A main criticism by CSAAWU is that union officials are not currently allowed to attend WIETA audits, nor are they even 
alerted about upcoming audits on particular farms. 
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Fairtrade	insists	that	management	shares	the	audit	results	with	workers,	but	this	is	not	
required	by	the	other	bodies.	Fairtrade	also	requires	that	management	allocates	time	to	
workers	 during	 regular	 working	 hours,	 as	 well	 as	 provides	 them	with	 the	 necessary	
resources	to	monitor	the	implementation	of	its	code	(FTC:	1.1.2–3).		
3.4.2. The frequency of audits   
Fairtrade	requires	that	audits	must	be	conducted	annually,	but	the	frequency	of	WIETA	
and	 SIZA	 audits	 varies	 according	 to	 the	 risk	 profile	 of	 the	 farm.	WIETA,	 for	 example,	
determines	whether	an	audit	 is	conducted	every	one	to	three	years,	based	on	a	farm’s	
risk	 rating,	 which	 is	 obtained	 from	 the	 previous	 audit,	 and	 the	 quality	 of	 corrective	
actions	 undertaken	 by	 the	 farm	 following	 the	 previous	 audit.	 Instances	 of	 non-
compliance	 that	 trigger	annual	 audits	within	 the	WIETA	system	 include	poor	housing	
and	 sanitation,	 non-payment	 of	 the	 minimum	 wage,	 physical	 or	 verbal	 abuse	 and	
systemic	disrespect	of	workers,	and	‘severe	non-compliances	with	the	basic	conditions	
of	 employment’	 (as	 laid	 down	 by	 the	 BCEA	 and	 the	 Occupational	 Health	 and	 Safety	
Act).53	
	
Similarly,	 the	 frequency	 of	 SIZA	 audits	 is	 determined	 by	 a	 farm’s	 risk	 profile	 plotted	
along	 SIZA’s	 Audit	 Frequency	 Matrix.	 The	 audit	 matrix	 distinguishes	 between	 four	









To	 prevent	 audit	 fraud,	 unannounced	 audits	 are	 conducted	 by	 Fairtrade	 and	 SIZA.	
WIETA	 does	 not	 conduct	 unannounced	 audits,	 but	 does	 follow-up	 audits	 on	 a	 ‘semi-
announced’	basis,	that	is,	farmers	are	given	just	a	few	days’	notice	prior	to	the	audit.55		




In	addition,	 audits	 identify	 instances	of	non-compliance	 that	 could	mean	considerable	
cost	for	the	farmer	to	rectify.		
																																								 																					
53 Interview with Linda Lipparoni, CEO of WIETA, 17 February 2017, Techno Park, Stellenbosch 
54 Interview with Retha Louw, CEO of SIZA, 21 February 2017, Somerset West 
55 E-mail communication with Linda Lipparoni, CEO of WIETA, 7 July 2017 
56 Since the introduction of enforced audits in the wine industry, Vinpro, the industry body for the South African wine 
industry, provides a once-off audit subsidy of R2 500 to its members. 
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so-called	 ‘core’	 standards,	 which	must	 be	met	 before	 a	 compliance	 certificate	 can	 be	







procedures,	 and	 the	 risk	 to	 the	 credibility	 of	 the	 Fairtrade	 system.58	 In	 the	 Fairtrade	
system,	suspension	or	decertification	disqualifies	producers	from	selling	their	produce	
as	Fairtrade.	Suspension	amounts	to	a	temporary	disqualification	until	producers	have	










The	WIETA	 code	 distinguishes	 between	 three	 types	 of	 standards:	 ‘Immediate’,	 which	
must	 be	 complied	 with	 at	 the	 initial	 audit;	 ‘Year	 2’,	 which	 must	 be	 in	 place	 a	 year	
following	 the	 initial	 audit;	 and	 ‘Better	 practice	 principles’,	 which	 do	 not	 have	 to	 be	




57 Interview with Linda Lipparoni, CEO of WIETA, and Amelia Heyns of WIETA, 17 February 2017, Techno Park, Stellenbosch; 
interview with Christo Conradie, Manager of Wine Cellars at Vinpro, Paarl, 20 February 2017 
58 See FLOCERT Standard Operating Procedure: Chapter 9. Available at: http://www.flocert.net/wp-
content/uploads/2014/02/CERT-Certification-SOP-31-en.pdf. 
59 In the case of Fairtrade, farmers sometimes voluntarily decertify themselves because the cost of certification outweighs 
the benefits.  
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WIETA	 has,	 remarkably,	 never	 suspended	 or	 decertified	 a	 farm.	 Towards	 the	 end	 of	













(APM)	 distinguish	 between	 minor,	 major	 and	 critical	 non-compliance.	 Yet,	 these	
distinctions	are	not	made	in	the	code	itself,	so	it	is	unclear	on	what	basis	SIZA	suspends	
producers.	 Although	 SIZA’s	 APM	 defines	 critical	 non-compliances,	 it	 does	 not	 include	
the	 words	 ‘suspension’	 or	 ‘decertification’.	 Instead,	 auditors	 are	 given	 the	 following	
instruction:		
	




reached	on	 the	 status	and	action	 to	be	 taken.	Based	on	 this	decision,	 the	audit	
entity,	SIZA,	the	audit	requestor	and	the	employment	site	can	then	work	together	
to	plan	an	appropriate	and	 timely	 resolution	 to	 the	 issue.	 (SIZA	APM:	4.5,	p.27,	
own	italics)		
	
According	 to	Louw	(SIZA	CEO),	 corrective	actions	made	by	 the	producer	 following	an	
audit	are	signed	off	by	the	auditor,	rather	than	by	SIZA.	If	the	auditor	does	not	sign	off	
on	 the	 corrective	 actions	made	 by	 the	 producer,	 then	 no	 audit	 confirmation	 letter	 is	






to	 correct	 their	 non-compliance.	 An	 audit	 confirmation	 letter	 is	 not	 issued	 unless	 all	
corrective	actions	are	done.61	 SIZA’s	Monitoring	and	Evaluation	Report	 for	2016	does	
not	 once	 refer	 to	 suspension	 of	 members.	 Given	 that	 independent	 audit	 companies,	
																																								 																					
60 Interview with Linda Lipparoni, CEO of WIETA, , 17 February 2017, Techno Park, Stellenbosch 
61 E-mail communication with Retha Louw, CEO of SIZA, 25 May 2017 
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which	are	profit-driven,	make	 the	 final	decision	as	 to	whether	a	producer	receives	an	






While	WIETA	 and	 SIZA	 are	 reluctant	 to	 decertify	 or	 suspend	 in	 favour	 of	 a	 remedial	
approach,	FLOCERT	argues	that	such	a	sanction	must	be	implemented	when	required:	
	
Otherwise	 you	 are	 really	 just	 condoning	 the	 minority	 of	 extremely	 poor	
conditions…Just	last	week	we	did	an	audit	on	a	farm…where	the	auditor	was	just	
shocked…You	actually	are	astounded	 that	people	would	apply	 [for	 certification]:	
illegal	migrants,	 people	without	 documentation,	 [management]	 holding	 on	 to	 ID	




4. LEVERAGING THE CODES BY TRADE UNIONS AND NGOS, AND 
VIA THE MEDIA 
In	 this	 section	 we	 gauge	 trade	 unions’	 and	 workers’	 knowledge	 of	 and	 level	 of	
engagement	 with	 the	 codes;	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 they	 have	 contested	 codes	 and	 the	
process	of	code-making	in	order	to	shape	the	codes;	and	the	degree	to	which	they	have	






because	 some	 interviewees	 reported	 that	 the	 trade	 union	 federation,	 Agricultural	
Workers'	Empowerment	Trade	Union	Council.	(AWETUC	had	trained	them	on	WIETA’s	
code	at	one	stage.)	None	of	the	unionists	could	identify	specific	provisions	in	the	codes	
that	 they	 found	 wanting	 or	 beneficial.	 This	 limited	 knowledge	 was	 displayed	 by	
statements	 such	 as	 ‘the	 codes	 need	 to	 get	 farmworkers	 and	 farmers	 to	 be	 able	 to	 sit	
together	and	engage’.	All	three	codes,	to	a	greater	or	lesser	extent,	aim	to	facilitate	such	
a	 process.	 Even	 SIZA,	 the	 least	 onerous	 of	 the	 three	 codes,	 requires	 that	 ‘there	 is	




62 Interview with representative of FLOCERT, 16 February 2017, Observatory, Cape Town 
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The	 unionists	 were	 not	 aware	 that	 Fairtrade	 and	WIETA	 require	 that	 producers	 pay	
workers	 a	 living	 wage	 and	 that	 both	 have	 provisions	 that	 promote	 freedom	 of	





to	 engage	 at	WIETA	board	meetings,	 this	 has	not	 translated	 into	 engagement	 at	 farm	
level,	 where,	 he	 argued,	 trade	 union	 organisers	 should	 do	 more	 to	 educate	 shop	
stewards	on	how	to	leverage	the	code.		
	
Supporting	 the	 above	 point,	 it	 was	 evident	 that	 the	 interviews	 had	 the	 effect	 of	
stimulating	 trade	 unionists’	 thinking	 about	 the	 codes.	 One	 interviewee,	 for	 example,	
repeatedly	acknowledged	that	 the	questions	being	asked	had	 ‘opened	up	his	 thinking’	
and	he	admitted	 that	 the	union	could	have	been	doing	more	with	regard	 to	 the	codes	
and	WIETA.	Other	interviewees	also	indicated	that	the	interviews	had	made	them	think	
about	the	codes	in	a	way	they	had	not	previously	done.	Clearly,	their	unions	had	never	




seems	 that	 the	 better	 an	 organiser’s	 knowledge	 of	 the	 codes,	 the	 more	 critical	 they	
were.	 For	 example,	 the	 director	 of	 the	 TCOE	 had	 workshopped	 the	 strengths	 and	
weaknesses	of	the	WIETA	code	with	CSAAWU’s	shop	stewards,	and	it	was	notable	that	
CSAAWU	organisers	had	much	 stronger	 critical	opinions	about	WIETA	 than	did	other	






farms	and	 that	 their	 impact	will	always	be	relatively	superficial	and	will	not	 lead	 to	a	
transformation	of	the	sector’.	He	argued	that	‘these	ethical	codes	mean	nothing’	as	‘the	




Apart	 from	 one	 seasoned	 unionist,	 who	 has	 worked	 in	 the	 industry	 for	 decades,	
unionists	 were	 unaware	 of	 the	 context	 or	 level	 of	 contestation	 in	 which	 the	 private	
codes	emerged.		
																																								 																					
63 Interview with Mzukisi Mooi, Centre for Rural Legal Studies, Stellenbosch, 15 February 2017  
 
	
30	 Are trade unions and NGOs leveraging social codes to improve working conditions? A study of two locally developed codes 




WIETA	 is	 the	 mouthpiece	 of	 the	 bosses…WIETA	 is	 not	 there	 for	 the	
workers…WIETA	 do	 not	 play	 a	 neutral	 role.	 WIETA	 is	 not	 supporting	 the	
workers…they	 are	 not	 enforcing	 ethical	 standards.	 All	 that	 WIETA	 does	 is	 to	














the	 role	 of	 government	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 codes.	 There	 was	 generally	 a	 sense	 that	
government	 should	 ‘play	 a	 bigger	 role’	 to	 protect	workers,	 and	 should,	 in	 some	way,	
take	more	of	a	lead	with	regard	to	the	codes.	One	trade	unionist	spoke	about	the	need	
for	 codes	 to	 ‘become	more	 legislative’,	which	 reflected	 the	 perception	 that	 legislation	
had	 more	 ‘teeth’	 than	 the	 codes	 (although,	 somewhat	 contradictorily,	 the	 same	
interviewee	spoke	about	the	codes	and	legislation	covering	much	the	same	areas).		
	
Most	 unionists	 believed	 that	 ultimately,	 all	 the	 codes	 do	 is	 provide	 ‘the	 seal’	 of	
certification,	which	 they	 felt	was	 not	 sufficiently	 effective;	 they	wanted	more	 explicit	
sanctions,	such	as	fines.	This	view	contradicts	the	view	that	not	getting	certification	or	
having	it	taken	away	would	be	a	much	bigger	threat	to	a	farmer	than	a	Department	of	





access	 to	 farms.	 However,	 this	 perception	 points	 to	 a	 lack	 of	 knowledge	 about	




64 Karel Swarts, quoted on the documentary Bitter Grapes 
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Another	 union	 interviewee	 said	 something	 similar:	 there	 needs	 to	 be	 government	
oversight	of	the	codes	and	compliance	with	them	–	this	cannot	be	left	to	private	codes.	
Unions	in	the	agricultural	sector	are	simply	too	weak	to	ensure	that	codes	are	enforced	
properly	 or	 beefed	 up.	 The	 fact	 that	 the	 codes	 have	 had	 only	 a	 limited	 impact	 on	
farmworkers’	 social	 conditions	 makes	 it	 inevitable	 that	 they	 will	 have	 to	 go	 to	
government	for	greater	assistance.		
	
The	 same	 interviewee	made	 the	 related	 point	 that	 no	 synergy	 exists	 between	 labour	
legislation	(which	includes	SD13)	and	codes.	Nothing	in	the	current	labour	statutes	and	
SD13	 even	 references	 the	 codes.	 He	 saw	 legislation	 and	 SD13,	 as	 enforced	 by	 the	
Department	of	Labour,	as	being	more	effective	than	private	social	codes.		
	
4.1. Using complaints procedures 	
One	of	the	advantages	of	the	codes	is	that	they	enable	better	enforcement	of	legislation	
in	 a	 context	 where	 the	 understaffed	 Department	 of	 Labour	 struggles	 to	 police	
compliance	with	labour	rights	in	the	sector.65	All	three	codes	standards	have	complaints	
procedures	to	report	non-compliance	by	their	member	farms.	However,	management	of	
WIETA	 and	 Fairtrade	 revealed	 that	 their	 complaints	 systems	were	 underutilised.66	 A	
representative	of	FLOCERT	commented:		
	
I	 find	 [the	 lack	 of	 use	 of	 our	 complaints	 procedure]	 interesting,	 because	
[contacting	us	about	something	that	is	wrong	on	a	farm]	would	be	an	easy	way	to	
get	the	job	done.	If	you	lay	a	complaint	with	us,	we’ll	go	and	do	the	audit	for	you	








The	 lack	 of	 complaints	 could,	 however,	 also	 be	 ascribed	 in	 part	 to	 the	 onerous	
procedures	 to	 be	 followed	 to	 lodge	 complaints.	 In	 addition,	 these	 procedures	 were	
seemingly	drawn	up	based	on	the	assumptions	 that	workers	have	 internet	access	and	
that	they	are	literate	in	English.	Alternatively,	the	assumption	is	that	workers	will	first	
report	 complaints	 to	 unions	 or	 NGO	 officials,	 who	 would	 then	 engage	 with	 the	
complaints	 procedures	 of	 the	 certifying	 bodies.	 But	 this	 assumption	 is	 questionable,	
given	that	the	vast	majority	of	farmworkers	are	not	members	of	trade	unions.		
																																								 																					
65 See: GroundUp: ‘Labour department can’t protect workers’, 9 May 2017, Daily Maverick. Available online at 
https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-05-09-groundup-labour-department-cant-protect-workers/#.WRmhiWdf34i. 
66 Interview with Linda Lipparoni, CEO of WIETA, and Amelia Heyns of WIETA, 17 February 2017, Techno Park; interview with 
Mzukisi Mooi, Centre for Rural Legal Studies, Stellenbosch, 15 February 2017 
67 Interview with representative of FLOCERT, 16 February 2017, Observatory, Cape Town 
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complaints	 after	hours	 and	 send	photographs	of	 their	payslips	 and	unsafe	 equipment	
and	 facilities	 in	 the	 workplace.	 Yet,	 even	 those	 who	 phoned	 or	 e-mailed	 through	
complaints	 eventually	 had	 to	 make	 use	 of	 WIETA’s	 formalised	 complaints	 system	 to	
trigger	 further	 investigations.	A	producer	board	member	of	WIETA	explained	 that	 the	
organisation	 required	 that	 a	 formal	 complaint	 be	 lodged	 via	 its	 system	 because	
previously	it	had	been	too	easy	for	unions	to	lay	complaints	against	farms	‘because	they	
had	 nothing	 to	 lose’.69	 When	 an	 investigation	 was	 launched	 (at	 great	 cost)	 no	





While	 a	 helpline	 number	 is	 also	 displayed	 on	 SIZA’s	 website	 and	 on	 its	 information	
poster	displayed	at	farms,	the	number	is	not	for	complaints.	On	dialling	the	number,	the	
caller	 is	 informed	 that	 the	 helpline	 was	 created	 to	 assist	 producers	 to	 upload	 their	
reports	onto	SEDEX’s	web	portal.70	Furthermore,	NGO	officials	who	were	 interviewed	
complained	 that	 they	 struggled	 to	 get	 access	 to	 the	 list	 of	 certified	 farms	 to	 establish	




68 Telephonic interview with Denile Samuels of AFIT, 1 March 2017 
69 Interview with Christo Conradie, Manager of Wine Cellars at Vinpro, Paarl, 20 February 2017 
70 Telephone call made by Margareet Visser to SIZA’s offices on 27 April 2017 




(visited 3 May 2017).  
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4.2 Using value chain round tables as a grievance forum 	
Instead	of	making	use	of	the	complaints	procedures,	unions	have	begun	to	report	non-
compliant	farms	directly	to	value	chain	round	tables	(VCRTs).	The	latter	is	an	initiative	
of	 the	 Department	 of	 Agriculture,	 Forestry	 and	 Fisheries	 (DAFF)	 to	 bring	 together	
stakeholders	in	the	value	chain	to	coordinate	the	processes	aimed	at	resolving	problems	
and	 enhancing	 competitiveness.	 Stakeholders	 on	 the	 VCRTs	 include	 worker	 and	
producer	 organisations,	 exporters,	 relevant	 government	 departments	 and	 parastatals,	
such	as	 the	CCMA.	Besides	bringing	together	 industry	decision-makers,	 the	VCRTs	are	
statutory	bodies,	and	so	have	clout.		
	
The	 fruit	 and	 wine	 VCRTs	 have	 created	 a	 Worker	 Welfare	 Working	 Group,	 which	
provides	a	forum	where	unions	and	NGOs	(that	are	not	necessarily	board	members	of	
either	 WIETA	 or	 SIZA)	 can	 come	 face-to-face	 with	 the	 management	 of	 industry	
organisations,	 such	as	Vinpro	and	Hortgro,	 as	well	 as	 the	management	of	WIETA	and	
SIZA.	 If	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 complaint	 falls	 outside	 the	 WIETA	 or	 SIZA	 code,	 or	 if	 the	
violation	 happened	 on	 non-WIETA	 or	 SIZA	 farms,	 a	 formal	 complaint	 is	 sent	 to	 the	
Department	 of	Agriculture	 (Western	Cape)	which	 investigates	 the	matter	 and	 reports	
back	to	the	WIETA,	SIZA	and	the	VCRT.74	It	is	interesting	to	note	that	the	Department	of	
Agriculture,	 rather	 than	 the	Department	 of	 Labour,	 has	 been	 approached	 to	 play	 this	
investigative	 role.	 The	 explanation	 from	 stakeholders	 was	 that	 the	 Department	 of	
Labour	was	not	up	to	the	task.		
	
Although	 the	Worker	Welfare	Working	 Group	 is	 supposed	 to	 discuss	 systemic	 issues	
that	plague	labour	relations	on	farms,	the	platform	has	become	the	main	forum	to	alert	
WIETA	 and	 SIZA	 about	 non-compliance	 with	 their	 codes.	 Two	 unionists	 have	 made	
extensive	 use	 of	 the	 Working	 Group	 meetings	 to	 report	 non-compliance	 with	 the	
codes.75	 A	WIETA	 board	member	 said	 he	 had	 suggested	 to	 CSAAWU	 that	 it	 does	 the	
same,	 but	 it	 had	 not	 done	 anything	 yet.	 As	 a	 result	 of	 these	 complaints,	 the	 wine	




73 See http://www.wieta.org.za/wieta_members.php (visited on 3 May 2017).  
74 Telephone conversation with Retha Louw, CEO of SIZA, 28 April 2017  
75 Interview with Linda Lipparoni, CEO of WIETA, and Amelia Heyns of WIETA, 17 February 2017, Techno Park, Stellenbosch; 
interview with Retha Louw, CEO of SIZA, 21 February 2017, Somerset West; interview with Mzukisi Mooi, Centre for Rural 
Legal Studies, Stellenbosch, 15 February 2017  
76 Anonymous source (1), 1 March 2017 
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The	 Grahamstown-based	 NGO,	 ECARP,	 followed	 a	 similar	 process	 to	 escalate	 its	
complaints,	 and	 facilitated	 the	 Agrarian	 Multistakeholder	 Dialogue	 Forum	 (AMDF).	
However,	because	the	AMDF	is	not	a	value	chain	round	table,	it	has	no	statutory	powers,	
which	means	 there	 is	 no	 obligation	 on	 stakeholders	 to	 attend	 the	 forum.	 The	 AMDF	
originally	 consisted	 of	 ECARP,	 its	 area	 committees,	 various	 government	 departments,	
the	 producer	 organisation	 Agri-Eastern	 Cape,	 the	 CCMA	 and	 SIZA.	 Agri-Eastern	 Cape	
withdrew	from	the	 forum	 in	reaction	 to	ECARP’s	protests	about	 land	reform.	Many	of	
the	 government	 departments	 have	 also	 left,	 so	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 forum	 has	
declined.	According	 to	 the	director	of	ECARP,	 the	 forum	discussed	non-compliance	on	
farms	 as	well	 as	 low	 legal	 thresholds.	 Louw	 (SIZA	CEO),	who	 continues	 to	 attend	 the	





4.3 An example of some leveraging of a code: AFIT 	
In	contrast	to	the	unions	and	ECARP,	which	have	mostly	used	the	codes	as	an	additional	
mechanism	 to	 enforce	 compliance	 with	 national	 legislation,	 AFIT	 has	 been	 more	
proactive	in	leveraging	codes,	specifically	the	Fairtrade	code.	AFIT	is	a	network	that	was	
established	 by	 an	 NGO,	 the	 Environmental	 Monitoring	 Group	 (EMG),	 to	 assist	 small	
farmers	 and	workers	 that	 are	 part	 of	 Fairtrade	 to	 leverage	 benefits	 from	 the	 system.	
AFIT’s	 interventions	 to	help	workers	on	Fairtrade	 farms	have	 focused	on	 three	areas.	
First,	 it	has	provided	extensive	rights-based	 training	 to	workers	by	hosting	an	annual	
spring	school	for	the	past	five	years.	It	has	also	hosted	a	travelling	theatre	for	workers	
to	 educate	 them	about	 concepts,	 such	 as	 solidarity,	 grievance	procedures,	 bargaining,	
sexual	harassment,	xenophobia	and	racism.		
	










However,	 another	worthwhile	AFIT	 initiative	has	not	 achieved	 success.	This	 initiative	




77 Interview with Retha Louw, CEO of SIZA, 21 February 2017, Somerset West 
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However,	 AFIT	 staff	 became	 ‘disillusioned,	 because	 one	month	 there	 were	 five	 trade	
unionists,	 but	 at	 the	 next	 meeting,	 there	 were	 only	 three’.78	 The	 staff	 member	 also	
complained	 that	unions	 failed	 to	provide	 ‘good	 feedback’	on	whether	 they	had	visited	









4.4 Leveraging codes via the media: The documentary 
Bitter Grapes 	
Leveraging	 of	 codes	 is	 not	 restricted	 to	 workers,	 trade	 unions	 and	 NGOs.	 A	 good	
example	of	how	someone	external	to	the	industry	can	engage	with	a	social	code	in	order	
to	 further	workers’	 interests	 is	 provided	 by	 the	 documentary	Bitter	 Grapes.	 Made	 by	
Danish	 film-maker	 Tom	 Heinemann,	 the	 documentary	 was	 screened	 on	 Danish	 and	
Swedish	television	towards	the	end	of	2016.	It	alleged	labour	law	violations	on	Western	
Cape	wine	farms	and	showed	workers	living	in	dire	housing	conditions.	It	also	included	
interviews	with	 CSAAWU,	 the	 director	 of	 TCOE,	 and	 organisers	 of	 Sikhula	 Sonke	 and	
BAWUSA,	unions	that	were	generally	highly	critical	of	WIETA.	
	
The	 documentary	 focuses	 on	 working	 and	 housing	 conditions	 on	 supplier	 farms	 to	
Robertson	 Winery.	 However,	 it	 also	 questions	 the	 checks	 and	 balances	 that	
Systembolaget,	 the	Nordic	 alcohol	monopoly	 that	 buys	wine	 from	Robertson	Winery,	




Industry	 sources	 dismissed	 the	 documentary	 as	 biased	 but	 it	 nevertheless	 had	
potentially	 serious	 repercussions,80	 particularly	 in	 Scandinavian	 countries.	 Following	
the	 documentary,	 the	 Danish	 supermarket	 chain,	 Dagrofa,	 temporarily	 withdrew	
Robertson	 Winery	 bottles	 from	 its	 shelves.81	 Dagrofa	 also	 prompted	 the	 Norwegian	
wine	 importer,	 Vinmonopolet,	 to	 conduct	 an	 inspection	 tour	 of	 South	 African	 wine	
																																								 																					
78 Telephonic interview with Denile Samuels of AFIT, 1 March 2017 
79 Telephonic interview with Denile Samuels of AFIT, 1 March 2017 
80 See ‘Biased documentary condemned’, Press release issued by Vinpro, 3 November 2016. Available at: 
http://vinpro.co.za/biased-documentary-condemned/; See ‘Response to Bitter Grapes documentary’, press release 
issued by Robertson Winery, 27 October 2016, available at: https://www.robertsonwinery.co.za/response-bitter-grapes-
documentary/. 
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farms.82	 In	 addition,	 Systembolaget,	 the	 Swedish	 alcohol	 monopoly	 that	 imported	
Roberson	Winery’s	wine,	came	under	fire	for	sourcing	unethically	produced	wine.	This	
prompted	Systembolaget	to	employ	an	additional	audit	company	to	verify	conditions	on	
Robertson	Winery’s	supplier	 farms.	 It	was	 feared	 that	 the	documentary	may	 lead	 to	a	














hoax,	 then	 it	 will	 never	 be	 sold	 in	 any	 Danish	 supermarket	 again.	 And	 that	 is	





Heinemann’s	 main	 criticism	 of	 WIETA	 was	 its	 failure	 to	 apply	 sanctions	 to	 non-
compliant	producers.	In	his	documentary	this	point	was	driven	home	by	Karel	Swart	of	





international	 network	 demanding	 better	 working	 conditions	 on	 wine	 farms	 in	 the	
developing	countries	from	which	Nordic	alcohol	monopolies	source.	The	EWTC	wrote	to	
Systembolaget	to	alert	 it	about	alleged	worker	rights	violations	on	South	African	wine	




82 See: ‘South African farmworkers get Norwegian award’ https://stiffkitten.wordpress.com/2017/03/23/south-african-
farmworkers-get-norwegian-award/. 
83 ‘SA wines pulled off Danish shelves after doccie on slavery at vineyards’, Tanya Farber, 23 October 2016, Sunday Times. 
See: http://www.timeslive.co.za/sundaytimes/stnews/2016/10/23/SA-wines-pulled-off-Danish-shelves-after-doccie-on-
slavery-at-vineyards1. 
84 Tom Heinemann, Skype interview, 28 February 2017 
 
	










their	 grievances	 into	 the	 public	 domain	 via	 national	 television.	 It	 gave	 South	 African	
trade	unions	the	opportunity	 to	exercise	 their	symbolic	or	moral	power	by	contesting	
the	legitimacy	and	credibility	of	WIETA	as	a	beacon	of	ethical	correctness.	As	noted	in	
the	 introduction	to	this	paper,	symbolic	power	 is	constituted	 in	the	public	sphere	(for	
instance,	 state	 television)	 and	 is	 elaborated	 in	 images	 and	 ideas	 that	 resonate	 with	




Heinemann,	however,	 told	only	part	 of	 the	 story	of	why	 the	 concept	of	 ethical	 or	 fair	
trade	 failed	 in	 this	 instance,	 by	 stopping	 at	 the	 farm	 gate.	 Unlike	 the	 EWTC,	 which	





we	 are	unable	 to	pay	 a	 living	wage	 to	workers	 if	 prices	 are	 so	 low.	But	 they,	 in	 turn,	
blame	their	government	for	the	low	prices.’88	Heinemann	said	he	made	a	decision	early	
on	 to	 focus	 only	 on	 the	 plight	 of	workers	 and	 not	 to	 include	 the	 value	 chain	 context	
which	 influences	 workers’	 livelihoods,	 because	 explaining	 this	 context	 would	 be	 ‘a	
major	complicated	story’.		
	
It	 is	 a	 pity	 that	 the	 documentary	 failed	 to	 use	 an	 important	 opportunity	 to	 push	 a	






85 See: ‘Cape farmworkers get a boost from Swedish wine value chain campaign’, Åsa Eriksson, 20 January 2014. 
http://www.plaas.org.za/blog/cape-farmworkers-get-boost-swedish-wine-value-chain-campaign. 
86 Heinemann’s previous documentaries include A Killer Bargain about the conditions of cotton workers in developing 
countries and The Bitter Taste of Tea, which questions whether workers labouring on Fairtrade-certified tea plantations 
are getting a better deal. See Tom Heinemann’s website at: http://tomheinemann.dk/. 
87 E-mail correspondence with Agnes Nygren, programme officers at Afrikagrupperna, 11 May 2017 
88 Interview with Linda Lipparoni, CEO of WIETA, and Amelia Heyns of WIETA, 17 February 2017, Techno Park, Stellenbosch 
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4.5 The impact of the documentary 
Heinemann’s	documentary	emphasised	labour’s	charge	that	WIETA	had	been	captured	
by	producer	interests.	In	the	documentary	a	union	member	of	WIETA’s	board	said:	‘We	
clearly	 have	 a	 case	 of	 power	 imbalances	 at	 play	 here	 and	producers,	 especially	 those	
with	deep	pockets,	seem	to	think	they	own	WIETA	as	their	marketing	tool’.	
	
Since	 the	 documentary,	WIETA	has	made	more	 effort	 to	 counter	 charges	 of	 producer	
capture	by	including	the	voices	of	ordinary	workers	in	its	policy	debates.	Towards	the	
end	 of	 2016	 it	 invited	 unions	 and	NGOs	 to	 a	workshop	 to	 discuss	WIETA’s	 policy	 on	
freedom	of	association.	It	met	with	the	ordinary	members	of	eight	unions	affiliated	with	
AWETUC	 to	 record	 their	 various	 grievances.	 Two	 meetings	 were	 also	 held	 in	
Stellenbosch	and	Robertson,	 the	respective	recruiting	grounds	of	 the	NGO,	Women	on	
Farms,	and	the	union,	CSAAWU,	to	share	information	with	ordinary	workers	about	the	
WIETA	code	and	 its	audit	process,	but	also	 to	allow	unions	 the	opportunity	 to	canvas	




At	 the	moment	 [because	of	 the	weekend	sessions]	we	can	actually	 say	 these	are	
the	 issues…	we	can	actually	say	[to	Vinpro]:	Listen,	 the	thirty	 farms	that	you	are	
raving	about	[that	are	allegedly	so	good],	well	these	are	the	types	of	things	that	are	
coming	 through...so	my	 argument	 is	 the	 extent	 to	which	 producer	 organisations	
actually	 understand	 the	 severity	 of	 the	 non-compliances	 that	 are	 happening	 out	
there.90	
The	 contestation	 within	 WIETA	 between	 labour	 and	 producers,	 as	 well	 as	 between	
producers,	did	not	just	happen.	In	a	private	(but	subsequently	leaked)	e-mail	to	fellow	
board	 members,	 written	 at	 the	 time	 Heinemann	 was	 filming	 in	 South	 Africa,	 the	









89 Interview with Linda Lipparoni, CEO of WIETA, and Amelia Heyns of WIETA, 17 February 2017, Techno Park, Stellenbosch 
90 Interview with Linda Lipparoni, CEO of WIETA, and Amelia Heyns of WIETA, 17 February 2017, Techno Park, Stellenbosch 








The	 power	 this	 gives	 WIETA	 made	 it	 important	 for	 producers	 to	 get	 control	 of	 the	
organisation,	hence	the	attempt	to	‘capture’	WIETA.	Lipparoni	explained:		
Many	 of	 [the	 producers]	 don’t	 necessarily	 have	 a	 choice	 in	 going	 through	 [the	
audit]	process,	but	they	have	to	become	part	of	that	process	by	virtue	of	having	







high’,	 especially	 in	 a	 context	where	 the	 local	wine	 industry	 is	 facing	difficult	 financial	





to	 actually	 say	 “enough,	 we	 have	 to	 be	 stricter”’.	 In	 the	 months	 following	 the	
documentary,	 WIETA	 decided	 to	 begin	 applying	 sanctions,	 as	 opposed	 to	 just	
threatening	to	apply	sanctions:	
• Producers	 who	 refuse	 to	 give	 auditors	 access	 to	 their	 farms	 to	 investigate	




• If	 producers	 fail	 to	 implement	 remedial	 actions	 following	 an	 audit	 within	 a	
prescribed	timeline,	they	will	be	suspended.93		
• The	 board	 has	 accepted	 the	 implementation	 of	 a	 new	 risk	 matrix	 that	 would	
categorise	 producers	 according	 to	 their	 performance	 against	 the	WIETA	 code.	
This	categorisation	will	be	displayed	on	their	compliance	certificate,	with	a	low	
ranking	reflecting	badly	on	a	producer.94		
• The	 board	 is	 reconsidering	 the	 ratio	 for	 what	 it	 considers	 to	 be	 ‘ethically	
produced’	 wine.	 Presently,	 boxed	 wine	 can	 qualify	 as	 WIETA-certified	 if	 it	 is	
																																								 																					
92 Interview with Linda Lipparoni, CEO of WIETA, and Amelia Heyns of WIETA, 17 February 2017, Techno Park, Stellenbosch 
93 Interview with Linda Lipparoni, CEO of WIETA, and Amelia Heyns of WIETA, 17 February 2017, Techno Park, Stellenbosch 
94 Interview with Linda Lipparoni, CEO of WIETA, and Amelia Heyns of WIETA, 17 February 2017, Techno Park, Stellenbosch; 
interview with Christo Conradie, Manager of Wine Cellars at Vinpro, Paarl, 20 February 2017 
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5. HAS THE STATE PLAYED A ROLE IN FACILITATING THE 
LEVERAGING OF CODES 
Our	final	question	is	whether	the	state	influences	the	capacity	of	local	actors	to	engage	
with	 codes	 to	 improve	 labour	 standards.	 Heinemann’s	 use	 of	 symbolic	 power	 might	
have	elicited	stricter	enforcement	of	WIETA’s	codes,	but	it	has	failed	to	raise	the	WIETA	







on	 better	 regulation	 of	 the	 wine	 and	 fruit	 value	 chains	 by	 the	 state.	 As	 already	
mentioned,	 labour	 legislation	fails	 to	adequately	protect	 the	growing	number	of	 fixed-
term	 and	 migrant	 workers	 employed	 on	 farms.	 If	 the	 state	 improves	 legislation	 to	
protect	such	vulnerable	workers,	private	code	makers	will	 in	all	 likelihood	follow	suit.	
Yet,	for	all	its	rhetoric	about	wanting	to	empower	farmworkers,	the	state	is	aware	of	the	






pay	 their	workers	 R150	 per	 day.	 BFAP	 concluded	 that	 this	 is	 the	 dilemma	 facing	 the	
agricultural	sector.	
	









95 E-mail communication with Linda Lipparoni, CEO of WIETA, 11 July 2017 
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Deregulation	destroyed	producers’	monopoly	power	and	contributed	to	a	switch	in	the	
character	 of	 the	 fresh	 fruit	 and	 wine	 global	 value	 chains	 –	 from	 producer	 to	 buyer	
driven	chains	–	 in	which	 lead	 firms	now	govern	value	chains.	This	switch	was	 further	
hastened	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 closure	 of	 agricultural	marketing	 boards	 happened	 at	 a	
point	 in	 time	 when	 retail	 power	 became	 increasingly	 consolidated.	 Thus,	 while	
producers’	 collective	 power	 dwindled	 following	 deregulation,	 retailer	 power	 surged.	
Instead	of	being	 forced	to	negotiate	with	producers	en	bloc	–	as	was	 the	case	prior	 to	
deregulation	–	retailers	began	to	play	off	producers	against	each	other,	putting	a	lot	of	
pressure	on	farm	gate	prices,	and	affecting	producers’	abilities	to	pay	higher	wages	and	
raise	 working	 conditions	 above	 legal	 minimum	 standards.	 Various	 studies	 have	
reported	on	the	relatively	small	share	of	value	that	accrues	to	producers,	in	comparison	




and	 externalised	 their	 labour	 forces	 to	 reduce	 their	 labour	 costs.	 Casualisation	 and	
externalisation	 of	 labour,	 in	 turn,	 thwart	 unionisation	 and	 impact	 on	 the	 ability	 of	
unions	to	effectively	engage	with	codes,	but	also	to	lobby	government	to	improve	labour	
regulations.	 The	 state’s	 deregulation	 of	 how	 fruit	 is	 marketed	 therefore	 also	
compromised	worker	 organisations’	 ability	 to	 horizontally	 govern	 the	 value	 chain:	 in	
this	 instance,	 to	shape	and	change	private	standards,	a	primary	 instrument	of	vertical	
governance	by	lead	firms.		
6. CONCLUSION 
This	 study	 explored	 the	 context	 in	 which	 two	 locally	 made	 private	 social	 codes	 had	
emerged;	 the	 scope	 they	 offer	 for	 improving	 farmworker	 conditions;	 to	 what	 end	
farmworker	organisations	engage	with	and	manage	to	leverage	codes;	and,	to	the	extent	
that	worker	organisations	 fail	 to	do	so,	 the	 reasons	 for	 such	 failure.	Finally,	 the	study	




challenged	 international	 consumers	and	 lead	 firms	about	poor	working	 conditions	on	
local	 fruit	 and	 wine	 farms.	 Local	 producer	 organisations,	 under	 pressure	 from	 lead	
firms	 smarting	 from	adverse	publicity,	 responded	by	developing	 the	WIETA	and	SIZA	
codes.	 These	 both	 protected	 their	 access	 to	 foreign	markets	 and	were	 seen	 to	 better	
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This	 study	 benchmarked	 the	 WIETA	 and	 SIZA	 codes	 against	 the	 Fairtrade	 code.	
Borrowing	 from	 Nelson	 and	 Tallontire’s	 (2014)	 narrative	 analysis,	 we	 conclude	 that	
SIZA	fits	best	into	the	Global	Sourcing	narrative	and	the	multi-stakeholder	WIETA	into	
the	 Pragmatic	 Development	 narrative,	 while	 Fairtrade’s	 much	 stronger	 focus	 on	 the	
promotion	of	enabling	rights	places	it	into	the	Broader	Development	narrative.	
	
Once	this	 foundation	had	been	 laid,	 the	study	focused	on	the	knowledge	possessed	by	
trade	 union	 and	 worker	 organisation	 officials	 about	 the	 WIETA,	 SIZA	 and	 Fairtrade	
codes.	 Second,	 the	 study	 investigated	whether	 these	organisations	have	 leveraged	 the	
codes	 to	 further	 farmworkers’	 causes.	 The	 findings	 were	 disappointing.	 Trade	 union	
officials	 had	 very	 limited	 knowledge	 of	 the	 codes	 and	 it	 seems	 that	 little	 strategic	
thinking	 had	 been	 done	 about	 the	 codes.	 Although	 NGO	 staff	 had	 somewhat	 better	
knowledge,	organisers	and	staff	of	both	types	of	organisation	were	generally	unaware	of	
standards	in	the	codes	that	are	higher	than	rights	in	national	 legislation	and	therefore	
offer	workers	 the	 scope	 to	 improve	 their	 conditions.	 Not	 surprisingly,	 there	 are	 very	
few	 examples	 of	 trade	 unions	 and	 NGOs	 leveraging	 the	 codes.	 Significantly,	 the	 one	













There	are	a	number	of	explanations	 for	 the	 lack	of	worker	organisations’	engagement	
with	 private	 social	 codes.	 First,	 they	 experience	 severe	 capacity	 problems:	 it	 is	 well-
known	that	the	manpower	of	cash-strapped	unions	and	NGOs	is	thinly	spread.	Worker	




A	 second	 explanation	 for	 this	 lack	 of	 engagement	 could	 be	 that	 local	 codes	 largely	
duplicate	 South	African	 legislation.	As	 a	 result,	 they	do	not	 offer	much	 scope	 to	 raise	
standards	 above	 the	 legal	 minimum	 standards.	 It	 therefore	 becomes	 a	 case	 of	 ‘why	
bother?’;	 especially	 in	a	 context	where	 the	 certification	bodies	do	not	apply	 sanctions	
rigorously.	However,	while	local	private	social	codes	may	duplicate	national	legislation,	
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To	 some	 extent	 this	was	 acknowledged	 by	 trade	 unions	when	 they	 compared	 labour	
conditions	on	Western	Cape	fruit	and	wine	farms,	where	codes	are	routinely	enforced,	
with	 those	 in	 other	 parts	 of	 the	 country.	 At	 a	minimum	 therefore,	 private	 standards	
appear	to	lead	to	better	enforcement	of	existing	labour	legislation.	However,	there	have	
been	other	impacts	stemming	from	the	codes.	Alford	(2015)	found	that	employers	have	
started	 to	 employ	 temporary	workers	directly,	 instead	of	 through	 a	 labour	broker,	 in	




some	unions	still	have	more	 faith	 in	enforcement	of	regulations	by	 the	Department	of	
Labour	 than	 in	audits	 carried	out	 in	 accordance	with	a	private	 code,	 even	 though	 the	
consequences	of	 failing	an	audit	are	potentially	much	more	severe	 than	 is	a	 fine	 from	
the	 Department.	 The	 operative	 word,	 however,	 is	 potentially,	 because	 in	 practice	
certifiers	 have	 failed	 to	 sanction	 non-compliant	 producers.	 Some	 union	 and	 NGO	
interviewees	 even	 went	 so	 far	 as	 to	 complain	 that	 WIETA	 has	 been	 ‘captured’	 by	
producers.	While	 SIZA	attracted	 less	 criticism	 than	WIETA,	 this	was	only	because	 the	
worker	 organisations	 are	much	more	 engaged	with	WIETA	 than	with	 SIZA,	 of	 which	
they	know	very	little.	
	
Lack	 of	 sanctioning	 by	 local	 code	 certifiers	 could	 be	 viewed	 as	 a	 failure	 of	 vertical	
governance,	as	one	would	expect	that	the	 lead	firms	in	these	value	chains	would	have	
better	checks	and	balances	 in	place	to	verify	code	enforcement.	But	 it	seems	that	 lead	
firms	 either	 turn	 a	 blind	 eye	 or	 tolerate	 a	 certain	 degree	 of	 non-sanctioning	 of	
producers.	 Their	 behaviour,	 however,	 must	 be	 understood	 in	 the	 light	 of	 the	
contradictory	 aims	 that	 are	 entailed	 in	 vertical	 governance.	 While	 lead	 firms	 exert	
control	down	their	supply	chains	in	the	form	of	social	standards,	they	also	set	prices	and	
demand	 certain	 quality	 and	 delivery	 standards.	 Lead	 firms	 have	 to	 strike	 a	 balance	
between	(primarily)	maintaining	prices	as	low	as	possible	and	demanding	that	workers	
get	paid	better	wages	and	have	improved	working	conditions.	 If	 the	balance	 is	wrong,	
they	 risk	 the	 sustainability	 of	 their	 supply	 chain,	 because	 both	 forms	 of	 governance	





impact	 on	worker	 organisations’	 abilities	 to	 leverage	 private	 social	 codes.	 The	 South	
African	state’s	policy	of	deregulation	destroyed	producers’	collective	bargaining	power	
in	 the	marketplace,	 and	 therefore	 their	 ability	 to	 demand	 higher	 prices	 and,	 at	 least	
theoretically,	 pay	 higher	 wages.	 However,	 having	 deregulated,	 the	 state	 has	 failed	 to	
make	 any	 effort	 to	mediate	 power	 relations	 between	 lead	 firms	 and	 local	 producers.	
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Increased	pressure	on	producers’	profit	margins	continues	to	have	major	consequences	
for	 workers.	 Various	 studies	 have	 reported	 on	 a	 process	 of	 labour	 restructuring	
involving	 extensive	 casualisation	 and	 externalisation,	 following	 a	 change	 in	 the	
agricultural	policy	environment	 from	1997	 to	2003	 (Du	Toit	&	Ally,	2003;	Greenberg,	
2003;	Alford,	 2015;	Visser	&	Ferrer,	 2015).	 Casualisation	 and	externalisation,	 in	 turn,	
bedevil	 unionisation	 as	workers	 on	 fixed-term	 contracts	 fear	 losing	 their	 jobs	 if	 they	
join	 a	 union.	 Without	 strong	 unions,	 workers’	 ability	 to	 challenge	 the	 vertical	
governance	of	lead	firms	and	leverage	standards	is	compromised.		
	
A	 main	 point	 of	 this	 study	 is	 that	 effective	 leveraging	 of	 private	 codes	 by	 workers	
depends	not	only	on	their	knowledge	of	and	capacity	to	‘ride’	codes,	but	also	on	effective	
vertical	and	horizontal	governance	of	the	value	chain	by	lead	firms	and	the	state.	Lead	
firms	 have	 failed	 to	 vertically	 govern	 value	 chains	 through	 local	 code-making	 and	
certification	 bodies	 to	 ensure	 decent	 work	 in	 their	 supply	 chains.	 The	 underlying	
structural	 reason	 is	 that	 they	 are	 demanding	 ethical	 work	 practices	 on	 farms	 while	
continuously	‘squeezing’	the	profit	margins	of	producers,	to	the	point	that	the	latter	are	
unable	to	remain	viable	commercial	entities.	Unless	these	deeper	power	relations	in	the	
value	 chain	 are	 addressed	 by	 improved	 horizontal	 governance,	 the	 efforts	 of	 worker	
organisations	to	leverage	codes	remain	limited.	Unfortunately,	neither	the	South	African	
state	 nor	 producers,	 via	WIETA	 and	 SIZA,	 are	 contesting	 the	 power	 imbalance	 in	 the	
fruit	 and	 wine	 value	 chains.	 Neither	 codes	 has	 sought	 to	 engage	 trading	 conditions	
beyond	 the	 farm	 gates	 of	 producers,	 while	 the	 state’s	 deregulation	 of	 the	 sector	
undermined	producers’	bargaining	power.	The	result	has	been	pressure	on	wages	and	
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